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WHO CARES HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS? 
 
Ryan D. Doerfler* 
 
Legislative intent is a fiction.  Courts and scholars accept this by and large.  As this 
Article shows, however, both are confused as to why, and, more importantly, as to 
what this entails.   
 
This Article argues that the standard account of why legislative intent is a fiction—
that Congress is a “they,” not an “it”—rests on an overly simplistic conception of 
shared agency.  Drawing on contemporary work in philosophy of action, this Article 
contends that Congress as such has no intentions not because of difficulties in 
aggregating the intentions of individual members, but rather because Congress lacks 
the sort of delegatory structure that one finds in, for example, a corporation.  This 
reformulated argument for intent skepticism reveals that recent attempts to 
rehabilitate actual, historical intent—all of which rest upon a delegatory model—are 
misguided. 
 
Second and more importantly, this Article argues that the fictional nature of 
legislative intent entails that, contrary to a recent, influential wave of scholarship, 
interpreters of legislation have little reason to care about the fine details of legislative 
process.  It is platitude that legislative text must be interpreted “in context.”  As this 
Article explains, however, “context” consists of information salient to author and 
audience alike.  This basic insight from philosophy of language necessitates what this 
Article calls the conversation model of interpretation, whereby legislation is treated as 
having been written by legislators for those tasked with administering the law (e.g., 
courts, agencies) and, critically, those on whom the law operates (e.g., citizens).  An 
interpreter thus occupies the position of conversational participant, hearing statements 
directed at her and other participants.  So situated, that interpreter reads legislative 
text in a “context” consisting of information salient both to members of Congress 
and to, for example, citizens. 
 
The conversation model displaces what this Article calls the eavesdropping model of 
interpretation, the prevailing paradigm among both courts and scholars.  When 
asking what sources of information an interpreter should consider, courts and 
scholars—both textualists and purposivists—reliably privilege the epistemic position 
of members of Congress.  The result is that legislation is treated erroneously as 
having been written by legislators for legislators.  An interpreter is thus relegated to 
eavesdropper, left to listen in on the conversation.  So situated, that interpreter reads 
legislative text in a “context” consisting of information salient to members of 
Congress in particular.  This tendency is plainest in recent scholarship urging greater 
attention to legislative process—the nuances of which are of high salience to 
legislators, but plainly not so to citizens. As this Article explains, attending to “how 
Congress really works” could make sense if Congress had unexpressed intentions to 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Thanks to Hrafn 
Asgeirsson, William Baude, Mitchell Berman, Adam Chilton, Richard Fallon, Abbe Gluck, Alon 
Harel, Aziz Huq, Genevieve Lakier, Brian Leiter, Jonathan Masur, Jennifer Nou, Martha 
Nussbaum, John Rappaport, Fred Schauer, Louis Michael Seidman, David Strauss, and the 
participants in the Chicago Junior Faculty Workshop for helpful comments and suggestions. 
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discover.  Because legislative intent is a fiction, however, Congress has no such 
hidden intentions to find. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Claims about legislative intent are pervasive and, contrary to much 
scholarly opinion,1 unavoidable.  The reason is that statutory interpretation, like 
ordinary conversation, is rife with what linguists and philosophers call pragmatic 
inference, i.e. inference based upon the practical circumstance.  In both 
mundane contexts and in the law, attribution of practical intentions is 
indispensable to understanding what people mean.  The War Powers Resolution 
(“WPR”), for example, states that the President shall “terminate any use of 
United States Armed Forces” within sixty days “unless,” among other things, 
“the Congress … has declared war.”2  Setting aside constitutional concerns,3 all 
agree that the WPR requires the President to terminate hostilities within sixty 
days unless Congress has declared war since those hostilities were initiated.  That 
Congress has declared war at some point4 is, by contrast, irrelevant.  Interpreters 
rightly treat this as obvious.  But how do they know?  As this Article explains, 
interpreters know what Congress is trying to say only because they know also 
what Congress is trying to do (here, limit the President’s authority to engage in 
hostilities without congressional approval). 
 
Although necessary, claims about legislative intent are also literally false.  
This is because, as an empirical matter, members of Congress do not share 
intentions.5  That Congress is a “they,” not an “it,” is a common refrain.6  But, 
as this Article explains, familiar public-choice theoretic arguments against 
legislative intent of the sort voiced by Kenneth Shepsle rest on a doubtful 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the 
Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 76 (2012) (“[N]o one need look for the fictional intent of Congress in 
searching for the meaning of its decisions.  The term ‘legislative intent’ is obscuring, even for 
those of us who consider ourselves ‘originalists’ in matters of statutory interpretation.  Intent is 
simply a constitutional heuristic used to remind judges that, in the end, it is not their decision, 
but Congress’s.”); Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 793 (1999) (“The notions of congressional understanding and legislative 
intent are merely metaphors, of course, and somewhat misleading anthropomorphizing 
metaphors at that ….”). 
2 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b). 
3 See Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101, 108-
12 (1984) (surveying arguments for and against). 
4 See, e.g., S.J. Res. 116, Pub. L. No. 77-328, 55 Stat. 795 (1941) (declaring war on Japan in the 
wake of Pearl Harbor). 
5 See generally MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY: A PLANNING THEORY OF ACTING 
TOGETHER (2014) [hereinafter BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY]; MARGARET GILBERT, JOINT 
COMMITMENT: HOW WE MAKE THE SOCIAL WORLD (2013) [hereinafter GILBERT, JOINT 
COMMITMENT]; John Searle, Collective Intentions and Actions, in INTENTIONS IN COMMUNICATION 
(Philip R. Cohen, Jerry Morgan, & Martha E. Pollack eds., 1990). 
6 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is A “They,” Not an “It”:  Legislative Intent As Oxymoron, 12 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). 
HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS  8/1/2016 1:59 PM 
4 
 
premise, namely that sharing intentions is about aggregation of attitudes.  As 
this Article shows, the ability to aggregate lots of individual intentions is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to the formation of shared intentions.  One can, for 
example, attribute to a corporation its general counsel’s intention to settle a 
lawsuit even if other members of the corporation are unaware of the suit.  As 
this Article goes on to argue, however, the much en vogue analogy between 
corporations and Congress also fails.7  To use the previous example, one can 
make sense of that attribution of an intention to settle only because members of 
a corporation share an intention to delegate to the corporation’s general counsel 
control over legal strategy.  Members of Congress, by contrast, share no 
corresponding intention to treat as authoritative the views of, say, a statute’s 
“principal sponsors” or “others who worked to secure enactment.”8  Add to this 
the lack of a mechanism for reconciling the intentions of, for instance, 
committee drafters and drafters of later amendments, and it becomes clear that, 
even on a more sophisticated understanding of shared agency, Congress has few 
if any intentions qua “it.” 
 
This Article argues that, to resolve the above tension—that Congress 
must have intentions for legislation to be meaningful, yet Congress has no 
“collective” intentions—one should embrace what philosophers call fictionalism 
about legislative intent.9  Fictionalism about some domain of human discourse 
is the thesis that claims within that domain are best understood not as aiming at 
literal truth but rather as involving a useful fiction.  When children play cops 
and robbers, for example, utterances such as “Mary has a gun!” or “The money 
is in the vault!” involve an obvious pretense.  In analytic philosophy, fictionalism 
is a well-established approach to making sense of a discourse that appears to 
refer to things that do not exist.10  As this Article explains, utterances within a 
fictionalist discourse are still apt or inapt.  It is just that aptness is determined by 
pretense in combination with facts on the ground.  Whether Mary “has a gun,” 
for instance, could hinge on whether Mary possesses a twig. 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 1, at 82 (“Just as corporations are bound by the statements of their 
agents, Congress may be bound by the statements of its agents.”); JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN 
AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON 280 
(2009) (“We find no problem attributing intentions to corporations, groups, and institutions in 
ordinary life ….”). 
8 ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 48 (2014). 
9 See generally Matti Eklund, Fictionalism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2011), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/fictionalism/. 
10 See, e.g., Gideon Rosen & Cian Dorr, Composition as Fiction, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO 
METAPHYSICS (Richard M. Gale ed., 2002) (arguing for fictionalism about ordinary objects); 
RICHARD JOYCE, THE MYTH OF MORALITY (2001) (arguing for fictionalism about morality); 
HARTRY H. FIELD, SCIENCE WITHOUT NUMBERS: A DEFENSE OF NOMINALISM (arguing for 
fictionalism about numbers). 
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This Article defends fictionalism about legislative intent as to claims 
about the United States Congress.  As this Article explains, intent claims about 
Congress are false if taken literally because federal statutes have no unitary 
author.  For that reason, the fiction this Article hypothesizes is that such statutes 
have some author or other.  Understood as involving this fiction, a claim about 
legislative intent is apt if and only if one would make that claim about a generic author 
just on the basis of her having written the statute at issue in the context of enactment.  So 
conceived, fictionalism about legislative intent amounts to a philosophical 
refinement of what textualists sometimes refer to as “objectified” legislative 
intent.11  Fictionalism improves upon prior accounts of objectified intent in that 
it both offers a more rigorous theoretical justification for attributing such 
intent—in particular, by explaining why intent attributions are necessary as 
opposed to merely useful— and provides a more precise account of the truth (or 
aptness) conditions of such attributions. 
 
To say that intent is a fiction is thus not to say that anything goes, that 
one can attribute any ‘intention’ one wants to a piece of legislation.  It is a 
platitude that a legislative text must be interpreted in “context.”12  As this Article 
explains, however, “context” consists of information salient to author and 
audience alike.13  “[P]articipants in [a] conversation” depend upon cognitive 
“common ground” to make known their communicative intentions.14  When, 
for example, Karen says to Amy, “I will see you at the beach,” that attempt at 
communication will succeed only if there is some beach that is salient to both.  
                                                 
11 E.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 424 (2005) 
[hereinafter Manning, Legislative Intent] (“[T]extualists focus on ‘objectified intent’—the import 
that a reasonable person conversant with applicable social and linguistic conventions would 
attach to the enacted words.”); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The 
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) 
[hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law Courts] (explaining that textualists appeal to “a sort of 
‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, 
placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”). 
12 See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2392 (2003) 
[hereinafter Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine] (“[I]t is now well settled that textual interpretation 
must account for the text in its social and linguistic context.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ 
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 536 (1983) (“The philosophy of language, and most particularly 
the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, has established that sets of words do not possess intrinsic 
meanings and cannot be given them ….”). 
13 See, e.g., Kent Bach, Content ex Machina, in SEMANTICS VERSUS PRAGMATICS 15, 19 (Zoltán 
Gendler Szabó ed., 2005) [hereinafter Bach, Content ex Machina] (“Communicative success 
requires uttering a sentence which, given the mutually salient information that comprises the 
extralinguistic cognitive context of utterance, makes the speaker’s communicative intention 
evident and enables his audience to recognize it.” (emphasis added)). 
14 Robert C. Stalnaker, Common Ground, 25 LING. & PHIL. 701, 701 (2002). 
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More generally, successful communication depends upon agreement among 
conversational participants as to what “matters.”15  For this reason, a speaker 
takes it for granted that what she says will be interpreted against the backdrop 
of information that is salient both to her and to those to whom she speaks.16 
 
The importance of the above insight to statutory interpretation is subtle 
but hard to overstate.  It necessitates what this Article calls the conversation model 
of interpretation, which is crucial to understanding the nature of legislative 
intent.  On this model, legislation is treated as having been written by Congress 
for those tasked with administering the law (e.g., courts, agencies) and for those 
on whom the law operates (e.g., citizens).  An interpreter thus occupies the 
position of conversational participant, hearing statements directed at her and the 
other participants.  So situated, an interpreter reads legislative text in a context 
consisting of information salient both to members of Congress and to, for 
example, citizens.  As this Article explains, adherence to the conversation model 
does not by itself dictate what sources of information an interpreter should 
consider when making sense of a statute.  What it does is limit the range of 
plausible answers to that question.  If, in addition to text, one thinks that courts 
should consider, say, legislative history, one is hard-pressed to explain why they 
should not also consider public statements by officials or reports by popular 
media outlets.  Such visible portrayals of legislation are, after all, of much higher 
salience to most Americans than House Report 114-706. 
 
The conversation model displaces what this Article calls the eavesdropping 
model of interpretation, which has been the prevailing paradigm among both 
courts and scholars.  When asking what information an interpreter should 
consider, both courts and scholars reliably privilege the epistemic position of 
members of Congress.  The result is that legislation is treated erroneously as 
having been written by legislators for legislators.  An interpreter is thus relegated 
to eavesdropper, listening in on the conversation.  So situated, an interpreter 
reads legislative text in a context consisting of information salient to members 
of Congress in particular.  This Article argues that privileging the epistemic 
                                                 
15 Stefano Predelli, Painted Leaves, Context, and Semantic Analysis, 28 LING. & PHIL. 351, 365 (2005); 
see also Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-originalist Theory of Legal Interpretation, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 597, 598 (2013) [hereinafter Soames, Deferentialism] (observing that “[i]n most standard 
linguistic communications, all parties know, and know they all know, … the general purpose of 
the communication”). 
16 Robert Stalnaker, Indicative Conditionals, in CONTEXT AND CONTENT: ESSAYS ON 
INTENTIONALITY IN SPEECH AND THOUGHT 63, 67 (1999) [hereinafter Stalnaker, Indicative 
Conditionals] (“A speaker inevitably takes certain information for granted when he speaks as the 
common ground of the participants in the conversation.  It is this information which he can use 
as a resource for the communication of further information, and against which he will expect 
his speech acts to be understood.”). 
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position of members could make sense if Congress had unexpressed intentions 
to discover—much in the way that it could make sense to consult an historical 
individual’s private papers when making sense of an unclear public statement.  
Because, however, legislative intent is a fiction, Congress has no concealed 
intentions to find.  There is, in turn, no corresponding reason to rifle through 
members’ personal effects. 
 
This Article shows that both textualists and purposivists adhere to the 
eavesdropping model much if not all of the time.  The longstanding debate over 
whether to consider legislative history,17 for example, reflects an impulse to 
eavesdrop on both sides.18  Adherence to the eavesdropping model is plainest, 
however, in recent, influential scholarship urging greater attention to “how 
Congress really works.”19  This scholarship asks interpreters, through attention 
to process, to sort legislative history “wheat” from “chaff.”20  Judge Robert 
Katzmann, for example, suggests that courts pay special attention to those 
materials participants in the drafting process use to “become educated about [a] 
bill.”21  Likewise, Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman recommend attention to 
different types of legislative history—along with other non-textual sources, such 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-an 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 964 
& n.212 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part I] (“The other primary interpretive source 
that courts consider—and the one whose use is most hotly contested—is legislative history.” 
(collecting cases)); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 353 (2005) [hereinafter 
Nelson, What Is Textualism?] (recognizing that “[t]extualists and intentionalists have a well-
known disagreement about the proper use of internal legislative history”); Adrian Vermeule, 
Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1833 (1998) (“Intentionalists and textualists have vigorously debated whether judges 
should consult legislative history in statutory interpretation cases.”). 
18 See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“I am confident that only a small proportion of the Members of 
Congress read either one of the Committee Reports in question ….”); KATZMANN, supra note 
8, at 18-19 (“In that circumstance, beyond the work of their own committees, of which 
legislators have direct knowledge, members operate in a system in which they rely on the work 
of colleagues on other committees. … Legislators and their staffs become educated about the 
bill by reading the materials produced by the committees and conference committees from 
which the proposed legislation emanates.”). 
19 Nourse, supra note 1, at 143 (“Both textualists and purposivists have to understand how 
Congress really works.”); accord KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 8 (“[T]here has been scant 
consideration given to what I think is critical as courts discharge their interpretative task—an 
appreciation of how Congress actually functions ….”). 
20 KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 54.  See also Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 989 
(“[T]he real question about legislative history is not whether it should be consulted but, rather, 
how to separate the useful from the misleading.”); Nourse, supra note 1, at 72 (“Since neither 
scholars nor lawyers dispute that, as a matter of fact, legislative history is used, the question is 
how it is best used.”). 
21 KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 19. 
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as Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) scores, and structural features like a 
statute’s “path through Congress”22—in proportion to the significance assigned 
to those sources by “drafters,” i.e. participants in the legislative drafting 
process.23  This Article argues that none of this makes sense when context 
consists of information salient to all, not to “drafters” in particular.  “[I]gnorance 
of how Congress works”24 is lamentable for various reasons.  But, as this Article 
contends, the nuances of the legislative process are largely irrelevant for the 
purpose of interpretation. 
 
This Article has three Parts.  Part I argues that claims about legislative 
intent are pervasive and unavoidable.  The argumentative strategy is to identify 
various parallels between ordinary conversation and statutory interpretation.  In 
both conversation and interpretation, this Part explains, an audience is interested 
in what proposition(s) a speaker intends to communicate as opposed to what 
proposition is, for example, expressed by sentence she utters.  And, drawing on 
contemporary work in philosophy of language by Charles Travis and other so-
called “radical contextualists”25—highly pertinent to but thus far wholly 
neglected by the statutory interpretation literature—this Part argues further that, 
in each setting, one can most often identify a speaker’s communicative intention 
only on the basis of her apparent practical intentions. 
 
Part II argues that claims about legislative intent are systematically false 
if taken literally.  Under the Constitution, legislative power rests with Congress 
as a collective.26  So understood, talk of legislative intent presupposes that the 
Congress is capable of forming shared intentions.  On any tenable account of 
shared agency, however, Congress as structured is systematically incapable of 
forming such intentions (other than the bare intention to enact text into law).  
Recent scholarship urging greater attention to the legislative process insists that 
shared intentions are there to be found if one looks hard enough.  This Part 
argues that greater attention to process instead supports skepticism about intent 
instead. 
 
                                                 
22 Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-an Empirical Study 
of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 780 (2014) 
[hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part II]. 
23 See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 988-89. 
24 Nourse, supra note 1, at 85; see also KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 49 (“The paucity of judicial 
knowledge about congressional rules and processes relating to the judicial process … is 
striking.”). 
25 See generally CHARLES TRAVIS, OCCASION SENSITIVITY: SELECTED ESSAYS (2008); FRANC ̧OIS 
RÉCANATI, LITERAL MEANING (2003). 
26 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress 
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”). 
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Part III argues that, to resolve the tension resulting from Parts I and II, 
one should embrace fictionalism about legislative intent. Again, on this 
approach, a claim about legislative intent is apt if and only if one would make 
that claim about a generic author on the basis of her having written the 
legislation at issue in the context of enactment.  As Part III explains, fictionalism 
does not by itself dictate what information an interpreter should consider as part 
of the context of enactment. It does, however, dramatically alter the range of 
plausible answers to that question, requiring that any information considered be 
of mutual salience to government actors and citizens.  Traditionally, the debate 
between textualists and purposivists has offered interpreters a choice between 
considering just formally adopted materials (e.g., legislative text, prior judicial 
decisions) and considering such materials plus certain information of high 
salience to government officials (e.g., legislative history).  Pursuant to 
fictionalism, the choice is, instead, between considering just formally adopted 
materials—salient to all in virtue of their formal bindingness—and considering 
such materials along with an array of non-textual sources including but not 
limited to public speeches and popular media coverage. 
I.  ATTRIBUTIONS OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT ARE UNAVOIDABLE 
 
Claims about legislative intent are pervasive and, contrary to popular 
belief, unavoidable. To understand why, bring to mind an ordinary conversation. 
There, recognizing a speaker’s intention is integral to efficient and effective 
communication.  As this Part explains, communication via statute is, as 
practiced, no different.27  For that reason, to make sense of legislation in a way 
                                                 
27 This Article assumes a standard Gricean account of communication according to which the 
meaning of words and sentences can be analyzed in terms of speaker intention, in particular the 
intention to communicate certain information via the utterance of sentences.  See, e.g., PAUL 
GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1991).  The Gricean framework contrasts with, for 
example, a semantic externalist framework, according to which the meaning a term is determined, 
in whole or in part, by factors external to the speaker.  See, e.g., SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND 
NECESSITY (1980).  As even its critics acknowledge, the Gricean framework enjoys “almost 
universal acceptance” within legal interpretation.  Marcin Matczak, Does Legal Interpretation Need 
Paul Grice: Reflection on Lepore and Stone’s Imagination and Convention (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with author) (defending an alternative, externalist account of statutory and constitutional 
interpretation); see also ERNIE LEPORE & MATTHEW STONE, IMAGINATION AND CONVENTION: 
DISTINGUISHING GRAMMAR AND INFERENCE IN LANGUAGE (2014) (defending an externalist 
account of communication generally).  Courts in particular accept a broadly Gricean—or, in 
terms more familiar to legal scholarship, intentionalist—framework more or less without 
exception.  See, e.g., F.A.A. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1450 (2012) (“[O]ur task is to determine 
what Congress meant by ‘actual.’”); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 
93 (2007) (“Under this Court's precedents, if the intent of Congress is clear and unambiguously 
expressed by the statutory language at issue, that would be the end of our analysis.”); Adamo 
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285, 98 S. Ct. 566, 573, 54 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1978) 
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that is at all consistent with our positive law of interpretation, one must attribute 
intentions to authors of legislation with much the same frequency as one does 
to speakers in ordinary conversation.  Legislative intent, it turns out, is not just 
a dispensable “metaphor.” 28 
 
A.  What Is Meant 
 
What an interlocutor cares about in ordinary conversation is a speaker’s 
communicative intent.  Take a simple case: it is late morning and A says to B, 
“Would you like a bagel?”  B responds, “No, thank you.  I’ve had breakfast.”  
Philosophers of language disagree as to whether, in this context, the sentence 
“I’ve had breakfast” expresses the proposition that A has had breakfast at some 
point in the past or the proposition that A has had breakfast that morning.29  Where 
everyone agrees, of course, is that B intends to communicate the latter 
proposition.30  And while the philosophical question regarding sentence 
meaning is interesting, for A’s purposes, what matters is that B’s communicative 
intention is clear. 
 
The above case is trivial.  What it shows is just that, in ordinary 
conversation, what is of interest to an interlocutor is what proposition a speaker 
intends to communicate.  Whether, for instance, that proposition corresponds 
to the proposition expressed (assuming there is one) by the uttered sentence is 
of interest to philosophers of language.  For conversational purposes, however, 
                                                 
(“In the Act, Congress has given a substantial indication of the intended meaning of the term 
[at issue].”); United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940) (“In the 
interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language 
so as to give effect to the intent of Congress.”); see also Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, 
110 NW. U. L. REV. 811, 826 (arguing that “it is well established as a matter of positive law that 
the object of  inquiry  in  statutory  interpretation  is  Congress’s  communicative intention,  
appropriately  conceived.”). 
28 E.g., John F. Manning, Inside Congress's Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1924 (2015) 
[hereinafter Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind]; Nourse, supra note 1, at 74 (“Let us agree that the 
anthropomorphic metaphor portraying Congress as a single person misleads.”). 
29 Compare Bach, Content ex Machina, supra note 13, at 37 (“[T]he speaker … didn’t say that he 
hadn’t had breakfast that day.  That’s because he left this for inference (notice that this inference 
is much harder to make if [the sentence] is uttered late in the day).”) with RÉCANATI, supra note 
25 at 21 (“[B]y saying that she’s had breakfast, the speaker implies that she is not hungry and 
does not to be fed. … Now th[is] implicature[] can be worked out only if the speaker is 
recognized as expressing the (non-minimal) proposition that she’s had breakfast that morning 
….”). 
30 See Bach, Content ex Machina, supra note 13, at 38-39. 
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what an interlocutor wants to know is what a speaker “means” in a broad, 
pragmatic sense.31 
 
The object of inquiry in statutory interpretation is, likewise, 
communicative intent as opposed to something like sentence meaning.  Another 
simple case: the War Powers Resolution states that the President shall 
“terminate any use of United States Armed Forces” within sixty days “unless,” 
among other things, “the Congress … has declared war.”32  Again, philosophers 
dispute whether, as used, this sentence expresses the proposition that the 
President shall terminate any military action within sixty days unless the 
Congress has declared war at some point in the past or the proposition that she shall 
do so unless the Congress has declared war against the target of the hostilities at issue 
since the commencement thereof.33  Interpreters agree, of course, that the statute is 
correctly interpreted as communicating the latter proposition.34  This is because 
(apparent) communicative intention behind the statute is clear.35  For purposes 
of interpretation, that is all that matters. 
 
Again, the above case is trivial.  What it shows is that, when engaging in 
statutory interpretation, what is of interest to courts is what proposition 
Congress (apparently) intends to communicate as opposed to, say, the 
proposition expressed by the sentence it uses.  As before, what courts want to 
know is what Congress “means” in a broad, pragmatic sense.36 
 
 
                                                 
31 See Soames, Interpreting Legislative Texts, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 404 
(“Semantic content is often merely a vehicle for getting to pragmatically enriched content, and 
sometimes the semantic content of a sentence is not itself asserted, or even included in what the 
speaker is committed to.”). 
32 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b). 
33 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
34 See, e.g., Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authorization, 4A Op. 
O.L.C. 185, 196 (1980) (“The practical effect of the 60-day limit is to shift the burden to the 
President to convince the Congress of the continuing need for the use of our armed forces 
abroad.”). 
35 Interpreters assume, for instance, that Congress would not intend to enact a requirement that 
would be trivially satisfied in all future cases. 
36 In other words, an interpreter is interested in what Richard Fallon refers to as a statute’s 
“contextual meaning.”  Richard H. Fallon Jr, The Meaning of Legal "Meaning" and Its Implications for 
Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1235 (2015).  Fallon argues that an interpreter 
might reasonably be interested in a variety of ‘meanings’ when interpreting a statute (e.g., 
“literal” meaning, “intended” meanings, “reasonable” meaning, “interpreted” meaning).  For 
reasons articulated below, however, if fictionalism is correct, various candidate ‘meanings’ 
collapse into one (e.g., “intended” meaning and “reasonable” meaning become one and the 
same).  See infra notes 233-272 and accompanying text. 
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B.  What Is Asserted 
 
Even where a speaker uses some sentence literally, one must appeal to 
the practical context in some if not all cases to determine what proposition that 
speaker intends to assert or, alternatively, what a speaker intends to claim.37  
“Context,” for these purposes, consists of the information that is “salient” or 
“relevant” to conversational participants.38  And what information is “salient” 
or “relevant” depends in part upon shared or individual practical ends of the 
participants.39  For that reason, to determine what a speaker intends to assert or 
to claim, one must, in some if not all cases, determine what she (and/or her 
interlocutors) intends to do. 
 
Courts too must appeal to context to determine what Congress 
(apparently) intends to assert even where it is assumed that Congress uses a 
sentence literally.  And, as with ordinary conversation, such appeals to “context” 
involve an assessment of what practical ends are at issue.  Often, courts appeal 
to context to determine Congress’ (apparent) communicative intent in so-called 
“hard” cases.40  As the discussion below illustrates, however, appeal to context 
is important but often unnoticed in “easy” cases as well. 
 
1. Ambiguity 
 
First, appeal to a speaker’s practical ends can be necessary for an 
interlocutor to resolve lexical or structural ambiguities in the words the speaker 
utters.  A familiar example: suppose that A says to B, “I will be at the bank this 
afternoon.”  To resolve the lexical ambiguity, i.e. whether “bank,” as used, refers 
to a river side or a financial institution, B will appeal to what it is that A (with B, 
                                                 
37 See Kent Bach, You Don’t Say?, 128 SYNTHESE 15, 28 (2001) (arguing that intuitions concerning 
the truth of a particular utterance pertain to “what a speaker is claiming,” as opposed to “what 
he is saying”). 
38 Bach, Content ex Machina, supra note 13, at 21 (“What is loosely called ‘context’ is the 
conversational setting broadly construed.  It is the mutual cognitive context, or salient common 
ground.  It includes ...salient mutual knowledge between the conversants, and relevant broader 
common knowledge”). 
39 See, e.g., Predelli, supra note 15, at 365 (observing that one must take into account “what 
intuitively matters” in a conversational context to evaluate the truth of a claim); Robert C. 
Stalnaker, Assertion, in CONTEXT AND CONTENT 78, 79 (1999) (“In particular inquiries, 
deliberations, and conversations, alternative states of the subject matter in question are 
conceived in different ways depending on the interests and attitudes of the participants in those 
activities.” (emphasis added)). 
40 Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975) (“The problem of justifying 
judicial decisions is particularly acute in ‘hard cases,’ those cases in which the result is not clearly 
dictated by statute or precedent.”). 
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perhaps) plans to do (e.g., to go fishing, to complete a financial transaction, etc.).  
Another example: suppose that A cautions B, “Flying planes can be dangerous.”  
To resolve the structural ambiguity, i.e. whether the words form a sentence that 
expresses the proposition that the act of flying planes can be dangerous or a 
sentence that expresses the proposition that planes that are flying can be 
dangerous, B must discern A’s apparent end (e.g., to discourage B from 
becoming a pilot, to persuade B not to go skydiving near the airport, etc.). 
 
Courts too must appeal to context to resolve lexical and structural 
ambiguities in the words that Congress selects.  As to lexical ambiguity, appeal 
to context can be necessary where a statute contains a word or phrase has two 
or more possible meanings.  Title VII, for example, states that it shall be 
unlawful for an employer to “discharge” an individual on the basis of her race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.41  Courts (rightly) take it as obvious that 
“discharge,” as used, refers to terminating employment as oppose to, say, 
shooting out of a canon.42  In so doing, however, courts (latently) attribute to 
Congress concern with discriminatory employment (as opposed to ammunition) 
decisions.  As to structural ambiguity, courts often must appeal to context 
where, for instance, a statute contains an adjective, adverb, or prepositional 
phrase adjacent to a list of nouns or verbs.  For instance, the federal aggravated 
identity theft statute mandates an additional term of imprisonment of two years 
for one who “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses” a form of identification 
of another person without lawful authority during or in relation to a covered 
felony.43  Courts rightly treat it as plain that, as used, “knowingly” modifies 
“transfers,” “possesses,” and “uses” (as opposed to, say, just “transfers”).44  In 
so doing, however, courts (latently) appeal to what it is that Congress is trying 
to do, namely punish knowing misconduct.45 
 
 
                                                 
41 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
42 See, e.g., Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004); McKennon v. Nashville Banner 
Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 354 (1995). 
43 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). 
44 See Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 648 (2009) (“All parties agree that the 
provision applies only where the offender knows that he is transferring, possessing, or using 
something.”); cf. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (treating it as obvious that the 
federal statute governing food stamp fraud, which criminalizes the “knowing[] use[], transfer[], 
acqui[sition], alter[ation], or possess[ion]” of coupons or authorization cards in a manner not 
authorized by the statute or regulation, applies only to knowing acquisition). 
45 Harder is whether “knowingly” modifies “without lawful authority.”  18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1); 
cf. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433 (holding that the word “knowingly,” as used in the statute governing 
food stamp fraud, modified the phrase “in any manner not authorized by [law]”). 
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2. Pragmatic Enrichment 
 
Second, appeal to a speaker’s practical ends can be necessary in cases of 
what some philosophers or language call “expansion”46 or “pragmatic 
enrichment.”47  Consider: if A says to B, “I’m ready,” one must appeal to features 
of the practical context to determine whether A intends to assert/claim that she 
is ready to leave for dinner, ready to enter the game, etc.48 In such a case, appeal 
to context is required to fill in the words the speaker omits.49  One can accept 
this regardless of what proposition (if any) one understands the sentence “I’m 
ready” to express in context.50 
 
Courts similarly must appeal to Congress’ practical ends in such cases.  
Section 102(b)(4) of the Americans with Disabilities Act, for example, makes it 
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a “qualified individual” on the 
basis of disability with respect to hiring.51  Courts (reasonably) take it as obvious 
that, as used, “qualified individual” refers to an individual qualified for the position 
for which she applied (as opposed to, say, qualified to operate a motor vehicle or qualified 
to vote).52  To arrive at this (surely correct) interpretation, however, one must 
attribute to Congress concern with a particular kind of discrimination, namely 
hiring discrimination against persons with the requisite skills.  Examples of this 
sort abound.53 
 
                                                 
46 Kent Bach, Conversational Impliciture, 9 MIND & LANGUAGE 124 (1994) [hereinafter Bach, 
Conversational Implicature]. 
47 E.g., Franc ̧ois Récanati, Pragmatic Enrichment, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO 
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 67, 70 (Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara eds., 2012). 
48 Other examples include sentences such as “Steel isn’t strong enough” and “The princess is 
late.”  Bach, Conversational Impliciture, supra note 46, at 127-28. 
49 See Kent Bach, Speaking Loosely: Sentence Nonliterality, 25 MW. STUD. PHIL. 249, 250 (2001) 
(“[W]e commonly speak loosely, by omitting words that could have made what we meant more 
explicit, and we let our audience fill in the gaps.  Language works far more efficiently when we 
do that.”). 
50 Compare, e.g., Bach, Conversational Impliciture, supra note 46, at 127 (arguing that such sentences 
fail to express complete propositions) with HERMAN CAPPELEN & ERNIE LEPORE, INSENSITIVE 
SEMANTICS: A DEFENSE OF 
SEMANTIC MINIMALISM AND SPEECH ACT PLURALISM 168-69 (2005) (arguing that such 
sentences express minimal propositions such as that A is just plain ready). 
51 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4). 
52 Larimer v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 370 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (“The 
term ‘qualified individual’ in that provision must simply mean qualified to do one’s job, as 
assumed though nowhere discussed in the legislative history and the cases.” (citations omitted)). 
53 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 60111(a) (authorizing Secretary of Transportation to issue notice if an 
operator of a liquefied natural gas facility lacks “adequate financial responsibility for the facility 
[for safety purposes]”). 
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3. Travis Cases 
 
Third, appeal to a speaker’s practical ends might be necessary as a matter 
of course.54  Charles Travis has put forward a variety of ingenious cases to 
suggest that the proposition expressed by a prima facie context-insensitive 
sentence nonetheless varies by context.55  For instance, Travis observes that 
whether a speaker says something true when uttering the sentence “The leaves 
are green” plausibly depends upon the practical interests at issue: 
 
A story. Pia’s Japanese maple is full of russet leaves.  Believing 
that green is the colour of leaves, she paints them.  Returning, 
she reports, ‘That’s better.  The leaves are green now.’  She 
speaks truth.  A botanist friend then phones, seeking green 
leaves for a study of green-leaf chemistry.  ‘The leaves (on my 
tree) are green,’ Pia says.  ‘You can have those.’  But now Pia 
speaks falsehood.56 
 
One may or may not be convinced that so-called “Travis cases”57 demonstrate 
global “semantic underdeterminacy” of sentences.58  One must concede, 
however, that such cases show that appeal to context can be—and, perhaps, is 
always—necessary to determine what proposition a speaker intends to assert 
                                                 
54 Cf. Bach, Content ex Machina, supra note 13, at 26-27 (“Even if what a speaker means consists 
precisely in the semantic content of the sentence he utters and that content is precise, this fact 
is not determined by the semantic content of the sentence.  The reason for this claim is very 
simple: no sentence has to be used in accordance with its semantic content.  Any sentence can 
be used in a nonliteral or indirect way.  A speaker can always mean something distinct from the 
semantic content of the sentence he is uttering.”) 
55 See, e.g., Charles Travis, Meaning’s Role in Truth, 105 MIND 451 (1996); Charles Travis, On What 
Is Strictly Speaking True, 15 CAN. J. PHIL. 187 (1985). 
56 Charles Travis, Pragmatics, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 87, 89 (Bob 
Hale & Crispin Wright eds., 1997). 
57 E.g., Agustin Vicente, On Travis Cases, 35 LING. & PHIL. 3 (2012). 
58 See, e.g., Martin Montminy, Two Contextualist Fallacies, 3 SYNTHESE 317 (2010) (arguing that 
radical contextualist arguments for global semantic underdeterminacy rest on two fallacies); 
Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109, 1120 (2008) 
(“It is true that the compositional nature of language—the ability to understand sentences we 
have never heard before—is one of the hardest and most complex of questions concerning the 
nature of language.  But anything even residing in the neighborhood of the ‘meaning is use on 
a particular occasion’ view of language fails even to address the compositional problem ….”). 
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(or, perhaps, the truth-conditions of what she asserts59) even if the sentence she 
utters contains no obviously context-sensitive component.60 
 
Courts too plausibly must appeal to context even where Congress uses 
sentences that are prima facie context-insensitive.  An example.  During a tour of 
the White House, A steals a pen from the President’s desk.  About to exit the 
property, a Secret Service Officer asks A to stop.  A panics and fatally stabs the 
Officer with the stolen pen.  A then shoves the pen into her bag, jumps into a 
cab, and speeds to the airport.  At the airport, A proceeds to the security check, 
where a TSA agent, invoking the federal prohibiting carrying a concealed 
dangerous weapon on an aircraft, asks her “Are you carrying a dangerous 
weapon?”61  A says, “No,” speaking truly.62  A continues on to the gate, where 
she is apprehended by the police.  Invoking the enhanced penalty provision of 
the federal statute prohibiting forcible assault on a federal officer asks, “Are you 
carrying a dangerous weapon?”63  A says, “No,” speaking falsely.64 
 
Again, the above example is fantastical.  The principle it illustrates, 
however, is straightforward.  Even where a statute uses some prima facie context-
insensitive predicate F (e.g., is a dangerous weapon, weighs one gram or more65), 
whether some object X (e.g., A’s pen, B’s stash of LSD tabs66) “counts as”67 F 
might depend upon the practical interests implicated by that legislation.  So long 
                                                 
59 See John MacFarlane, Nonindexical Contextualism, 166 SYNTHESE 231, 246 (2009) 
(hypothesizing a “‘counts-as’ parameter” that “settles what things have to be like to have various 
properties: e.g. the property of weighing 160 pounds, or of being tall”). 
60 What is distinctive about Travis cases is that such cases suggest intuitions about truth-values 
depend upon context even when the sentence uttered contains no demonstrative, indexical, etc. 
61 See 49 U.S.C. § 46505(b)(1) (criminalizing attempt to board an aircraft while concealing a 
“dangerous weapon” that would be accessible during flight). 
62 See United States v. Dishman, 486 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that a starter pistol 
incapable of firing a projectile was not a “deadly or dangerous weapon” within the proscription 
of § 46505’s predecessor statute, reasoning that “the proscribed weapon must be one that is a 
“deadly and dangerous” weapon per se or inherently so through its construction”). 
63 See 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) (providing for enhanced penalties where an individual uses a “deadly 
or dangerous weapon” in the course of forcibly assaulting a federal officer). 
64 See United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that an automobile 
may qualify as a “deadly weapon” for purposes of § 111(b) if used as such, accepting that “[f]or 
an object that is not inherently deadly, … the object must be capable of causing serious bodily 
injury or death to another person and the defendant must use it in that manner”). 
65 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(v) (establishing a mandatory minimum sentence of five-years’ 
imprisonment for distribution of “1 gram or more” of a “mixture or substance” containing a 
detectable amount of LSD). 
66 See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991) (holding that, for purposes of § 841(b)(v), 
weight of “mixture or substance” containing a detectable amount of LSD includes weight of 
blotter paper). 
67 MacFarlane, supra note 59, at 246. 
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as there exist two practical contexts, one in which “X is F” expresses a truth and 
one in which it expresses a falsehood, one must appeal to context to determine 
whether X “counts as” F for purposes of the statute at issue. 
 
 
C.  What Is Implied, Intimated, Etc. 
 
 Last, what a speaker intends to communicate often exceeds what she 
asserts.  The most familiar cases here are those of “implicature,” a phenomenon 
explored famously by Paul Grice.68  Implicature is a form of indirect 
communication.  If, for example, A asks B, “Would you like coffee or tea?” and 
B responds, “I would like coffee,” all agree that B has not asserted the 
proposition that B would not like tea.  Be that as it may, all agree that B intends 
to communicate that proposition (e.g., A knows not to bring coffee and tea).69  
Or suppose that A asks B, “Do you know where I can get some gas?,” and B 
responds, “There is a gas station around the corner.”70  All accept that B has not 
asserted that the gas station around the corner is open for business.  
Nonetheless, it is clear to all that B intends to communicate that proposition 
(e.g., A need not follow up with, “Okay, but is it open?”).71 
 
 Using implicature to communicate more than one asserts advances a 
variety of ends.72  Most relevant here, using implicature promotes verbal 
efficiency: Through implicature a speaker can communicate multiple 
propositions by uttering a single sentence.73 
 
 Courts likewise regularly attribute to Congress the intention to 
communicate more than it asserts.  In particular, courts recognize many of the 
same sorts of Gricean implicatures as do interlocutors in ordinary conversation.  
Where, for example, a statute contains a provision defining its pre-emptive 
reach, courts will assume, absent additional evidence, that Congress intends not 
                                                 
68 See H.P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS, VOLUME 3: SPEECH ACTS 
(Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975). 
69 See id. at 45 (identifying maxim of “quantity,” i.e. maxim that one should “[m]ake [one’s] 
contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)”). 
70 See id. at 51. 
71 See id. at 46 (identifying maxim of “relation,” i.e. maxim that one should “[b]e relevant”). 
72 See, e.g., PENELOPE BROWN & STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, POLITENESS. SOME UNIVERSALS IN 
LANGUAGE USAGE (1987) (arguing that indirect speech can be used to promote the value of 
politeness). 
73 See STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRESUMPTIVE MEANINGS: THE THEORY OF GENERALIZED 
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE 28-31 (2000); cf. Elizabeth Camp, Metaphor and that certain ‘je ne 
sais quoi’, 129 MIND & LANGUAGE 1, 3 (2006) (“Because metaphorical utterances … express 
such complex contents in so few words, they are highly efficient vehicles for communication.”). 
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to pre-empt matters outside that reach.74  Or where a statute expressly creates a 
right, courts will assume, other things equal, that Congress intends there to be a 
corresponding remedy.75 
 
 Scholars dispute whether Grice’s account of implicature “readily 
translate[s] from the conversational setting to the complex, multilateral 
bargaining process of framing a statute.”76  All agree, however, that implicature 
does and should play some role in statutory interpretation—no one disputes, for 
example, that application of the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon is 
legitimate in some cases.77  As in the conversational context, the use of 
implicature, however restricted, promotes verbal efficiency.78  To require that 
legislation make explicit every proposition communicated would be 
cumbersome if not practically impossible. 
 
* * * * * 
 
 To sum up: statutory interpretation as practiced involves widespread 
attribution of legislative intent.  First, in all cases, what is of interest to an 
interpreter is the proposition(s) Congress (apparently) intends to communicate 
as opposed to, say, the proposition expressed by the sentence Congress used.  
                                                 
74 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (“Congress’ enactment of a provision 
defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-
empted.”)). 
75 See Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916) (inferring a private right of action 
from a statutory requirement, reasoning that “[t]his is but an application of the maxim, Ubi jus 
ibi remedium,” i.e. where there is a right there is a remedy). 
76 Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 12, at 2462 n. 274; see also Andrei Marmor, Can the 
Law Imply More Than It Says?  On Some Pragmatic Aspects of Strategic Speech, in LANGUAGE IN THE 
LAW 81 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) (arguing that, unlike ordinary conversation, 
conversation in the legal context is often strategic and so allows for only limited pragmatic 
inference); Soames, Interpreting Legislative Texts, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 
422 (“The legislative process is governed by purposes that transcend, and sometimes conflict 
with, the conversational ideal of the efficient and cooperative exchange of information.  
Consequently, the way in which conversational maxims based on this ideal contribute to filling 
the gap between the meaning and content of legal texts may, in some cases, differ from their 
contribution to filling similar gaps in ordinary conversations.”). 
77 See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 179 (2011) (“Consider the 
once-dreaded maxim of negative implication, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.  The specification 
of one thing surely does not always mean the exclusion of others. … Still, while there is no 
master rule that can tell us when the maxim applies, that does not mean that skilled users of 
language are utterly unable to identify when a speaker has used language in a way that creates a 
negative implication.  We do so all the time.  Sometimes the maxim’s applicability is obvious; 
other times, it is subject to reasonable disagreement.” (footnotes omitted)). 
78 Less clear is whether values such as politeness are implicated by the legislative context.  See 
supra note 72. 
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Second, in most if not all cases, an interpreter must attribute to Congress various 
practical intentions79 in order to attribute to it a communicative intention.  
Attributions of practical intent are often latent.  Such attributions are, however, 
necessary if one is to understand legislation as an effective means of 
communication—which, as a matter of positive law, courts plainly do.80  It is 
possible—though, in the author’s view, highly doubtful—that courts are 
mistaken in thinking of legislation as a means of communication.81  Legislation-
as-communication has intuitive appeal, and is, for that reason, the “standard 
picture” among legal theorists.82  In addition, it is the “law of interpretation” 
within our federal system,83 or, perhaps better, the positive law of “what the 
                                                 
79 This Article uses the phrase “practical intention” to refer to both general and specific practical 
aims.  As used, the phrase thus encompasses what Mark Greenberg and others refer to as “legal 
intention,” i.e. the intention to alter legal rights or obligations in a particular way.  Mark 
Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication, 
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217 (Andrei Marmor & Scott 
Soames eds., 2011) [hereinafter Greenberg, Legislation as Communication?].  To go back to the 
WPR example, the intention that one attributes to Congress to limit the President’s authority to 
engage in hostilities without congressional approval is plausibly a legal intention in Greenberg’s 
sense.  Nonetheless, this Article characterizes it as a practical intention for the reason that it is 
intuitively glossed as what Congress is trying to do, as opposed to what Congress is attempting 
to say.  Of course, one could, in addition, attribute to Congress on the basis of its enacting the 
WPR the more general practical intention of, say, maintaining the separation of powers or 
reducing the frequency of significant military intervention.  The point here is just that the phrase 
“practical intention,” as used, is not limited to such general aims or purposes. 
80 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2494 n.4 (2015) (“Congress said expressly that it 
wanted to avoid adverse selection in the health insurance markets.”); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 (2014) ( “Congress speaks with specificity when it intends a 
religious accommodation not to extend to for-profit corporations”); Jones v. United States, 529 
U.S. 848, 858 (2000)  ( “Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite ….” 
(quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–222 (1952)); Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (“First, always, is the 
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.  If the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter ….”)); United States v. Nat'l City Lines, Inc., 337 
U.S. 78, 84 (1949) (“Congress indeed meant what it said ….”); United States v. Am. Sugar Ref. 
Co., 202 U.S. 563, 577 (1906)  (“[I]t is the meaning of Congress … we are to ascertain ….”); 
The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263, 274, 22 S. Ct. 102, 106, 46 L. Ed. 190 (1902)  (“Congress meant 
by the[se] words … but one thing ….”). 
81 For arguments that legislation should not be regarded as a means of communication, see, e.g., 
Greenberg, Legislation as Communication?; Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945 
(1990).  Assessing the merits of these arguments goes beyond the scope of this Article. 
82 Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of the Law, 123 YALE L. J. 1288, 1296-97 (2014) 
(describing the “standard picture” as the view that “the content of the law is primarily 
constituted by linguistic (or mental) contents associated with the authoritative legal texts,” 
observing that the picture “has deep roots in ordinary thought about the law,” and is 
“encapsulated in the layperson’s idea that the law is what the code or law books say”). 
83 William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2017); cf. William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2349 (2015) 
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[statutory] law is.”84  For these reasons, this Article assumes the picture of 
legislation as communication arguendo.  And, given that picture, attributions of 
legislative intent, both communicative and practical, are to a large degree 
unavoidable. 
 
 Among other things, the above-identified need to attribute to Congress 
practical intentions calls into question the textualist claim that, when interpreting 
a statute, one should prioritize so-called “semantic context” over “policy 
context.”85  According to John Manning, “semantic context” consists of 
“evidence that goes to the way a reasonable person would use language under 
the circumstances.”86  Included in “semantic context” are such things as 
“dictionary definitions,” “specialized trade usage,” and “colloquial nuances that 
may be widely understood but that are unrecorded in standard dictionaries.”87  
“Policy context,” by contrast, consists of “evidence that suggests the way a 
reasonable person would address the mischief being remedied.”88  Within the 
ambit of “policy context” are: 
 
[M]atters such as public knowledge of the mischief the 
lawmakers sought to address; the way competing interpretations 
of a discrete statutory provision fit with the policy reflected in 
the statute’s preamble, title, or overall structure; and the way 
alternative readings of the statute fit with the policy expressed in 
similar statutes.89 
 
Manning argues that “[w]hen contextual evidence of semantic usage points 
decisively in one direction, that evidence takes priority over contextual evidence 
that relates to questions of policy.”90  What Travis cases in particular suggest, 
however, is that, to determine what a speaker intends to say, one must, in nearly 
                                                 
(articulating a positive law argument for originalism about constitutional interpretation); Stephen 
E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821 (2015) (same). 
84 See Mitchell Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2009) (noting the distinction 
“between what the law is and what judges should do” when interpreting a legal text). 
85 John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 76 (2006) 
[hereinafter Manning, What Divides?]; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between 
Textualist and Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation-and the Irreducible Roles of Values and 
Judgment Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 693 (2014) [hereinafter Fallon, Three Symmetries] 
(observing that “Professor Manning's distinction between semantic contexts and policy contexts 
hav[e] achieved broad acceptance”). 
86 Manning, What Divides?, supra note 85, at 76. 
87 Id. at 92. 
88 Id. at 76. 
89 Id. at 93. 
90 Id. at 92-93. 
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all instances, determine first what she intends to do.91  In most cases, what a 
speaker intends to do is obvious, making the corresponding determination 
unthinking or automatic.  Nonetheless, is it a determination a listener must 
make.  With respect to statutes, this suggests that “evidence of semantic usage” 
is rarely clear when considered apart from evidence of “the mischief being 
remedied.”  Again, very often, that “mischief” will be so apparent that it will not 
require conscious consideration.  All the same, even in easy cases, what the 
legislature intends to do must be taken into account.  As this Article explains 
below, the question remains what sources an interpreter should consider when 
making sense of a statute.  This claim here is just that, in most cases, one cannot 
determine how “a reasonable person would use language under the 
circumstances” apart from evidence of purpose, whatever the source. 
II.  CONGRESS AS SUCH HAS NO INTENTIONS 
 
 So attributions of legislative intent are widespread and seemingly 
unavoidable.  The problem is there is no legislative intent.  At least not in the 
United States Congress.  As this Part explains, the Constitution vests the 
legislative power in Congress as a collective.  On any plausible account of shared 
agency, however, Congress as structured is systematically incapable of forming 
collective intentions (other than the bare intention to enact text into law).  As a 
consequence, attributions to Congress of legislative intent in the familiar sense 
are systematically false.  
 
A.  Congress Is an “It,” Not a “They” 
 
 As far as the Constitution is concerned, Congress is an “it,” not a “they.”  
Article I, § 1 vests all legislative powers in “a Congress.”92  The Constitution also 
specifies various things “the Congress” may or shall do.93  In each instance, the 
                                                 
91 This cuts against the argument voiced by Joseph Raz that legislative intent “plays no real role” 
in interpretation because, barring specific exceptions, “one means what one says.”  RAZ, supra 
note 7, at 286-87; see also id. at 287 (“[T]he normal way of finding out what a person intended to 
say is to establish what he said.  The thought that the process can be reversed mistakes the 
exceptional case … for the normal case”).  If determining what a speaker “says” requires 
attention to the practical circumstances in most cases, Congress’s practical ends have an 
important role in interpretation most of the time. 
92 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
93 See, e.g., id. § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes …”); id. cl. 8 
(“[The Congress shall have the power to] [t]o establish Post Offices and post Roads ….”); id. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of … inferior Officers, as 
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments.”). 
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Constitution refers to Congress as a collective as opposed to a mere set of 
individuals.  To illustrate, when a disgruntled citizen says, “Congress is out of 
touch,”94 her claim is best understood as something like that most members of 
Congress are out of touch.95  So taken, the claim that Congress is corrupt is akin 
to the claim that ravens are black or that the 12th Man cheers the Seattle 
Seahawks; it a generic ascription of a trait to the individuals that constitute the 
referenced set.96  By contrast, when the Constitution says, “[T]he Congress may 
… establish [inferior courts],”97 the takeaway is not that a generic member of 
Congress may establish such a court on her own.  Rather, it is that Congress 
may do so as a collective, much in the same way that the Villanova Wildcats may 
win the NCAA championship or that the Supreme Court may grant certiorari. 
 
 The above might seem obvious.  One must bear it in mind, however, 
when thinking about the slogan that Congress is a “they,” not an “it.”98  As 
discussed below, that slogan was introduced as a banner for skepticism about 
legislative intent.  But, more recently, it has come to border on truism, accepted 
even by some who find recognition of legislative intent unproblematic.99  This 
broad, casual acceptance of the thesis that Congress is a “they” makes little 
sense.  If the legislative power belongs to Congress as a collective, the choice is 
stark: either Congress forms intentions qua “it” or there is no legislative intent. 
 
B.  Traditional Skepticism 
 
 Traditional skepticism about legislative intent is rooted in skepticism 
about the aggregability of attitudes of legislators.100  In one form, traditional 
                                                 
94 Letters to the Editor, Congress Out of Touch with America, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 24, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-congress-out-of-touch-with-
america/2014/06/24/4b1a8fae-fadb-11e3-9f27-09f20b8bfd1a_story.html. 
95 See id. (citing as evidence that Congress is out of touch that “House Majority Leader Eric 
Cantor (Va.) is … out of touch”). 
96 See Sarah-Jane Leslie, Generics, in ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward 
Craig ed., 2011), http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/U059. 
97 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
98 Shepsle, supra note 6. 
99 See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 22, at 737 (acknowledging “Kenneth Shepsle’s 
famous insight that Congress is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 
GEORGETOWN L.J. 705, 711 (1992) [hereinafter McNollgast, Positive Canons] (“As Kenneth 
Shepsle reminds us, ‘Congress is a they, not an it.’”). 
100 Traditional skepticism has historical roots in an influential article by Max Radin.  See Max 
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930) (“The chances that of several 
hundred men each will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind as possible 
reductions of a given determinable, are infinitesimally small.”). 
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skepticism fixes on legislator preference.  As public-choice theorists observe, 
majority preference of a legislative body need not be transitive, i.e. a majority of 
legislators might prefer X to Y and Y to Z, but also Z to X.101  For this reason, 
the legislative process is susceptible to “cycling” unless structured produce a 
final vote.102  But this means that legislative outcomes might be owed to “agenda 
sett[ing],” i.e. control over on what gets voted and when,103 making it impossible 
to “differentiate,” in a given case, “the ‘will of the majority’ from the 
machinations … of agenda setters.”104  Alternatively, legislative outcomes might 
be owed to “logrolling,” i.e. strategic trading of votes between legislators.105  
Logrolling “yields unanimity on every recorded vote,” masking substantive 
policy disagreement.106  “[T]he legislative process is,” thereby, “submerged,” and 
“courts lose the information they need to divine the body’s design.”107  Or so 
the argument goes. 
 
 In its other form, traditional skepticism fixes on legislator intention.  The 
legislative process does not require legislators to prefer one policy to another 
for the same reasons.108  Thus, even where substantive policy preferences align, 
different legislators might have in mind different ends—for instance, Legislator 
A might prefer policy X to policy Y because she believes policy X will be more 
efficacious while Legislator B might do so because she believes that policy X 
will be less efficacious but an adequate fig leaf.109  In such a scenario, “there is 
                                                 
101 See Shepsle, supra note 6, at 241-44; see also Leo Katz, A Theory of Loopholes, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1, 
11–12 (2010) (providing an illustration). 
102 Shepsle, supra note 6, at 241-44 
103 Id. at 246 (noting “structural advantages of agenda setters, both in determining what the full 
chamber may vote on and when (proposal power), and more subtly on what the full chamber 
may not vote on (veto power)”); see also Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 547-48 (“Legislators 
customarily consider proposals one at a time. … Additional options can be considered only in 
sequence, and this makes the order of decision vital.”). 
104 Shepsle, supra note 6, at 248. 
105 Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 548. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 See Shepsle, supra note 6, at 244 (“[T]he winning majority consists of many legislators; their 
respective reasons for voting against the status quo may well be as varied as their number.”); see 
also Timothy W. Grinsell, Linguistics and Legislative Intent, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2471026 (“Shepsle and Easterbrook 
both treat the problem of ‘many intents’ as independent of the Arrowian-based argument.  To 
some degree, it is: individual legislators may have the same ranking of proposals for entirely different 
reasons.” (footnote omitted)). 
109 See, e.g., Health-Care Cooperatives: Fig Leaf or Fix?, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (August 18, 
2009), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2009-08-18/health-care-cooperatives-fig-leaf-
or-fix-businessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice (discussing, in the 
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not a single legislative intent, but rather many legislators’ intents.”110  And one 
simply has no way of knowing whether such a scenario obtains.111 
 
 Traditional skepticism draws various responses.  Some question the 
frequency with which cycling occurs in practice.  Daniel Farber and Philip 
Frickey, for example, maintain that social choice theory’s predictions of 
arbitrariness and instability are “markedly inconsistent with our empirical 
knowledge of legislatures such as the U.S. Congress.”112  Among other things, 
Farber and Frickey cite Congress’ committee structure and the distribution of 
member preferences along a “unidimensional, liberal-conservative spectrum” as 
making cycling unlikely.113  Others insist that skeptical fears ought to be dispelled 
simply by the familiar practice of attributing intentions to multi-member bodies 
such as corporations.  Justice Stephen Breyer reasons, for instance, that 
“[c]orporations, companies, partnerships, municipalities, states, nations, armies, 
bar associations, and legislatures engage in intentional activities, such as buying, 
selling, promising, endorsing, questioning, undertaking, repudiating, and 
legislating.”114  “Linguistic and social conventions (complicated but well 
understood),” Breyer assures, “tell us when and how to attribute purposes to 
these bodies.”115  Others still observe that the possibility of cycling is not unique 
to the decisions of multi-member bodies.  Timothy Grinsell explains that cycling 
can occur where individuals apply multicriterial predicates, i.e. predicates that 
denote a decision function aggregating multiple criteria into a single judgment, 
such as “healthy” or “nice.”116  Because we have no difficulty attributing 
coherent intentions to individuals who apply such predicates, Grinsell argues, 
                                                 
context of the ACA, whether proposed healthcare cooperatives are an effective substitute for 
previously advocated public insurance option). 
110 Sheplse, supra note 6, at 244. 
111 See id. at 248 (“When a bill passes the House and Senate in the same form, and is signed by 
the president, there are only limited inferences to be drawn.  We know that one majority in each 
chamber has revealed a “preference” for the bill over x0.  We do not know why, and it is likely 
that each legislator has a mix of different reasons.”). 
112 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 Va. L. Rev. 
423, 430 (1988). 
113 Id. 
114 STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 99 (2011) 
[hereinafter BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK]. 
115 Id.; see also Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 845, 864-65 (1992) (“One often ascribes ‘group’ purposes to group actions.  A law school 
raises tuition to obtain money for a new library.  A basketball team stalls to run out the clock.  
A tank corps feints to draw the enemy’s troops away from the main front. … All this is to say 
that ascribing purposes to groups and institutions is a complex business, and one that is often 
difficult to describe abstractly.  But that fact does not make such ascriptions improper.  In 
practice, we ascribe purposes to group activities all the time without many practical difficulties.”). 
116 Grinsell, supra note 108. 
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the mere possibility of cycling cannot be enough to render problematic 
attributions of intentions to legislatures.117 
 
 The above responses draw their own responses.118  What this Part 
suggests, however, is that this whole dialectic misses the fundamental problem 
with attributions of legislative intent.  A premise of traditional skepticism—
unquestioned by the abovementioned respondents—is that the aggregability of 
legislator attitudes is a necessary (and, perhaps, sufficient) condition for 
legislative intent.  That premise is squarely at odds with philosophical accounts 
of shared agency, which recognize that, for there to be shared intention, 
aggregability is neither necessary nor sufficient. 
 
C.  Accounts of Shared Agency 
 
 Sometimes we act side by side.  Other times we act together.  
Philosophical accounts of shared agency try to make sense of the difference. 
 
 Take Margaret Gilbert’s example of taking a walk.119  Suppose that you 
and I walk next to each other through the park but each is unaware of or 
indifferent to the other.  In this case, you and I each walk alone in some sense.120  
Suppose now that you and I each walk the same path but do so as part of a date.  
In this case, you and I walk together in the sense that we are engaged in a “shared 
cooperative activity.”121  In each case, our external behavior is the same.  What 
differ are our respective intentions.122  In the first case, I intend that I walk 
through the park and you intend that you do the same.  In the second case, each 
                                                 
117 See id. at *3 (“Since … the public choice argument applies with equal force to decisions made 
by legislatures and to decisions made by individuals, the notions of legislative intent and 
individual intent stand or fall together.  And we should let them stand.” (footnote omitted)). 
118 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Public Choice Defended, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 789–93 (2005) (arguing 
that cycling can be common and is often unseen because it is pushed back in the legislative 
process); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative 
Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503 (1981) (arguing that the absence of apparent cycling does not imply 
the absence of preferences that induce cycling). 
119 See Margaret Gilbert, Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon, 15 MW. STUD. PHIL. 
1 (1990). 
120 See id. at 2 (“Imagine that Sue Jones is out for a walk along Horsebarn Road on her own.  
Suddenly she realizes that someone else-a man in a black cloak-has begun to walk alongside her, 
about a foot away.  His physical proximity is clearly not enough to make it the case that they are 
going for a walk together.  It may disturb Sue precisely because they are not going for a walk 
together.”). 
121 Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, 101 PHIL. REV. 327 (1992). 
122 Cf. Searle, supra note 5, at 403 (discussing analogous examples, observing that “[e]xternally 
observed the two cases are indistinguishable, but they are clearly different internally.”). 
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of us intends that we walk through the park.  It is this “we-intention,”123 
philosophers suggest, that distinguishes our shared cooperative activity from a 
“mere summation or heap of individual acts.”124 
 
 For there to be shared cooperative activity, we-intentions must be shared.  
At a minimum,125 this means that, for a collective as such to φ, its members—
either all or sufficiently many126—must each intend that “we” φ.127  If, for 
example, I intend that we walk through the park but you are unaware of my 
presence, we do not walk together (despite my mistaken belief that we do128).  In 
addition, each member’s intention that “we” φ must be transparent, i.e. each 
                                                 
123 Id. at 404. 
124 Abraham S. Roth, Shared Agency, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2011), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/shared-agency/.  Philosophers disagree as 
to whether we intentions can be reduced to ordinary individual intentions.  Compare, e.g., 
BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY, supra note 5, at 4 (“[I]ndividual planning agency brings with it 
sufficiently rich structures—conceptual, metaphysical, and normative—that the further step to 
basic forms of sociality, while significant and demanding, need not involve fundamentally new 
elements.”) with Searle, supra note 5, at 407 (arguing that “we-intentions are a primitive 
phenomenon” and that we intentions are “not reducible to I-intentions plus mutual beliefs”).  
Where philosophers agree is that some sort of “participatory intention” is a necessary condition 
of shared agency.  Christopher Kutz, Acting Together, 61 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
RESEARCH 1, 3 (2000). 
125 This Article identifies only certain necessary conditions of shared agency.  What conditions 
suffice for shared agency goes beyond the scope of this Article and is a matter of philosophical 
dispute. 
126 Whether an intention need be shared by all or sufficiently many members to be attributed to 
a group plausibly depends upon whether that group is “ephemeral” or “institutional.”  See id. at 
28.  Ephemeral groups, according to Christopher Kutz, “are groups whose identity as a group 
consists just in the fact that a set of persons is acting jointly” (e.g., a group pushing a car).  Id.  
Institutional groups, in contrast, have additional identity criteria (e.g., to be a member of the 
U.S. Senate, it is not enough for one to “intentionally participat[e] in its deliberations; one must 
instead be elected in accordance with operative elections procedures).  Id. at 28-29.  In the case 
of ephemeral groups, it seems straightforward that all members of a group must share an 
intention to φ for that intention to be attributed to the group: what makes that group a group, 
after all, is just its shared intention to φ.  Compare this to institutional groups such as the U.S. 
Senate: because the Senate exists as a group for reasons apart from its members shared intention 
to φ, it is at least plausible that one could attribute to the Senate an intention to φ if a large 
enough subset of senators shared that intention.  This Article need not answer this question. 
127 See BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY, supra note 5, at 152 (identifying as a necessary condition of 
shared agency that “[w]e each have intentions that we J”); GILBERT, JOINT COMMITMENT, supra 
note 5, at 7 (“[I]n the process of joint commitment, two or more people jointly commit the same 
two or more people.” (emphasis omitted)). 
128 For me to believe that we walk together, I must believe that we share an intention to do so.  
See BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY, supra note 5, at 42 (“Of course, an individual may have an 
intention he would express as ‘we will do it,’ and yet be mistaken that his use of ‘we’ succeeds 
in referring.  Perhaps he is a brain in a vat.  But in that case there is no shared intention ….”). 
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member must recognize that each other member also intends that “we” φ.129  
Hence, if each of us intends that we walk through the park but each keeps that 
intention a secret, we do not (yet130) walk as a joint venture.  Last, members must 
intend to coordinate their efforts toward φing.131  We do not share an intention 
that we walk through the park if, for instance, we make no effort to walk at the 
same pace. 
 
 Whenever there is an instance of shared cooperative activity, one can, in 
a minimal sense, correctly attribute an intentional action to a collective as such.  
When, for example, you and I walk through the park together, one can truthfully 
say that we walk through the park in a way that one cannot when you and I 
merely walk side by side.  Likewise, whenever one can correctly attribute an 
intentional action to a collective, one can, again, in a minimal sense, correctly 
attribute an intention to that collective.  Hence, when we walk through the park, 
one can ascribe to us the intention to do so in a way that one cannot when you 
and I each walk alone.  Philosophers disagree as to whether and to what extent 
collective action must involve collective agents in some metaphysically interesting 
way.132  Similarly, philosophers disagree as to whether and under what conditions 
it makes sense to regard a collective as constituting a “group mind” to which 
one could reasonably attribute cognitive attitudes.133  This Article need not wade 
                                                 
129 See, e.g., GILBERT, JOINT COMMITMENT, supra note 5, at 7 (“In the basic case [of joint 
commitment], … each makes clear to each his personal readiness to contribute to it, in a way 
that is entirely out in the open to all.”); Michael E. Bratman, Shared Intention, 104 ETHICS 97, 99 
n.8 (identifying “common knowledge” as a necessary condition of shared agency). 
130 Assuming we are not confused, each of us intends in this case that we walk together at some 
point in the (near) future.  See supra note 128.  For us to succeed, we must disclose our respective 
intentions to one another prior to our walk.  See GILBERT, JOINT COMMITMENT, supra note 5, at 
29 (describing mutual expression of intention to walk together resulting in a “joint decision” to 
do so).. 
131 See BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY, supra note 5, at 52 (“If we share an intention to go to NYC, 
and if you intend that we go to NYC by taking the New Jersey local train while I intend that we 
go by taking the Amtrak train, we have a problem.  In a case of shared intention we will normally 
try to resolve that problem by making adjustments in one or both of these sub-plans, perhaps 
by the way of bargaining, in the direction of co-possibility.”). 
132 Compare Philip Pettit & David Schweikard, Joint Actions and Group Agents, PHIL. SOC. SCI. 18, 
30 (2006) (seeing “no metaphysical reason why a joint intentional action has to be the product 
of a single agent”) with Margaret Gilbert, What Is It for Us to Intend?, in SOCIALITY AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN PLURAL SUBJECT THEORY 14, 22 (2000) [hereinafter Gilbert, 
What Is It?] (reasoning that, if there is shared intentional activity, there is a “plural subject” of 
that shared intentions). 
133 Compare BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY, supra note 5, at 127 (“Should we say … that the group 
agent of the shared intentional action is the subject of this intention?  I think that this is not in 
general true: in modest sociality there need not be a group subject who has the shared intention.  
To talk of a subject who intends is to see that subject as center of a more or less coherent mental 
web of, at the least, intentions and cognitions.  The idea of a subject who intends X but has few 
other intentional attitudes—who intends X in the absence of a mental web of that subject in 
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into these discussions.  For present purposes, to say that a collective as such φs 
is just to say that its members φ as a shared cooperative activity.  In turn, to say 
that a collective intends to φ is just to say its members share an intention to φ as 
a collective, i.e. that its members share a we-intention to φ.  If one accepts that 
there is such a thing as shared cooperative activity,134 one can and should accept 
such minimal claims. 
 
Questioning the applicability of the above model of shared agency to 
large groups, Christopher Kutz argues that a shared intention to φ is too strong a 
condition for a collective to φ in the case of, say, an orchestra.  Kutz reasons 
that, because the contribution of an individual member to the groups φing is 
minimal, it makes no sense for her to intend to bring it about that the group 
φs.135  As a weaker alternative, Kutz proposes that members need share an 
intention to do their respective parts in φing for the collective to φ.136  Kutz’s 
argument rests, at bottom, on disputable linguistic intuitions.137  Regardless, 
Kutz’s “minimal contribution” concern, id., has little purchase as to legislation, 
where each member’s “contribution,” i.e. her vote, is conditional on enough 
other members so contributing. 
 
 Scott Shapiro contends similarly that a shared intention to φ is too strong 
a condition for large groups because collective φing can occur even when some 
members of a collective are “alienated,” i.e. even when some members do their 
part despite being apathetic or even hostile to the project of φing.138  As a 
motivating example, Shapiro imagines two unaffiliated contractors each paid 
$1,000 to do “what [the hiring party] tells him to do.”139  The hiring party tells 
                                                 
which this intention is located—seems a mistake.”) with Gilbert, What Is It?, supra note 132, at 
14 (articulating “an account of shared intention as the intention of a plural subject” (first emphasis 
added)). 
134 As opposed to, say, mere “strategic interaction.”  BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY, supra note 5, 
at 92 (“A central thought of this discussion is that modest sociality, while consisting in 
appropriate forms of interconnected planning agency, is not merely strategic interaction within 
a context of common knowledge.”); see also Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden, Collective Intentions 
and Team Agency, 66 J. PHIL. 109 (2007) (“A general problem for … accounts [of shared agency] 
is how to differentiate collective intentions from the mutually-consistent individual intentions 
that lie behind Nash equilibrium behaviour in games. “). 
135 See CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 98 (2000) 
(claiming that for “an individual cellist” to intend that “[the orchestra] play the Eroica” would be 
for her to “take too grandiose a view of his or her role”).   
136 Id. at 98-99.   
137 See id. at 98 (claiming that it would “ring false” to attribute to an individual cellist the intention 
that “we play the Eroica”).   
138 Scott J. Shapiro, Massively Shared Agency, in RATIONAL AND SOCIAL AGENCY: ESSAYS ON THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL BRATMAN 257, 270 (Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe eds., 2014).    
139 Id.   
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one contractor to scrape the old paint off his house and the other to paint a new 
coat on the scraped surface.140  Each does as told.  From this, Shapiro infers that 
the contractors “have intentionally painted the house together.”141  This, Shapiro 
continues, despite the contractor instructed to scrape having been indifferent to 
whether the other contractor applied the paint.142  Shapiro thus concludes, 
contractors need not share an intention that “we” paint the house to paint the 
house together intentionally.143   
 
 The problem with Shapiro’s example is that it conflates intentionally 
brought about with brought about by intentional activity.  In the example, each 
contractor acts intentionally: The first contractor intentionally scrapes off the 
old paint while the second contractor intentionally applies the new.  What results 
is a newly painted house.  That result was reasonably foreseeable to each.  But a 
newly painted house was not brought about intentionally.  At least not as far as 
the first contractor is concerned.  Rather, a newly painted house is the 
foreseeable result of the two contractors’ strategic interaction.144   
 
 Despite this, there is some truth to Shapiro’s more general observation.  
As explained above, it is plausible to attribute to an institutional group an 
intention to φ despite some members of that group failing to intend that “we” 
φ.145  One can imagine, in turn, scenarios in which an institutional group might 
intend to φ despite some its members being “alienated” from the project of φing.  
If, for example, most members of Congress were to vote for a gun bill with the 
intention that “we” facilitate the purchase of assault rifles, it would be plausible 
to attribute to Congress the intention to facilitate the purchase of assault rifles 
even if a handful of members voted in favor begrudgingly to preserve their 
National Rifle Association “grades.”146   
 
 Return now to traditional skepticism.  Just from the above sketch of 
shared agency, one can infer that neither preference nor intention aggregability 
is a sufficient condition for there to be legislative intent.  Consider the 
motivating example of taking a walk.  If you and I walk through the park side 
by side but each is unaware of the other, each of us prefers walking to other 
activities (assume for the sake of argument that our alternatives are the same).  
                                                 
140 Id.   
141 Id.   
142 Id. at 271 (“[The contractor] do[es]n’t care a wit about painting the house, only [about] getting 
[his] money.”).   
143 Id. 
144 See supra note 134. 
145 See supra note 126.   
146 See How the N.R.A. Rates Lawmakers, THE NEW YORK TIMES (December 19, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/12/19/us/politics/nra.html. 
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More to the point, each of us intends to walk through the park.  As such, both 
our preferences and our intentions are aggregable in the way the traditional 
skeptic demands—aggregable in terms of the activity preferred or intended—
here, to walk through the park—without regard to whether that activity is 
conceived as individual or joint.147  In this case, however, we do not intend to 
walk through the park—even if you and I each do. 
 
 What of necessity?  At one level, aggregability of legislator intention is, 
by definition, a necessary condition of legislative intent on the account of shared 
agency just sketched: if a collective intends to φ only if its members share an 
intention that “we” φ, then, for all cases in which Congress intends to φ, its 
members’ respective intentions to φ will be aggregable.  In relation to traditional 
skepticism, however, to say that shared agency entails intention aggregability is 
misleading.  Traditional skeptical arguments all have to do with the aggregability 
of substantive policy preferences or intentions (e.g., an intention to curb carbon 
emissions, a preference for expanding access to Medicaid, etc.).148  But, for 
reasons touched on by Lawrence Solan, a legislature might, in an exercise of 
shared agency, intend a substantive policy without all or even a majority of 
legislators ever having had that policy in mind.149  Drawing on examples from 
Gilbert, Solan observes that members of Congress might share an intention to 
enact some policy X the details of which are to be determined by some  specific 
member (e.g., a bill sponsor, a committee chair, etc.), subset of members (e.g., a 
committee), or, conceivably, some non-member third party (e.g., an executive 
branch official, a lobbyist, etc.).150  In so doing, Congress would exercise shared 
agency in much the same way as do you and I if each of us intends that we take 
                                                 
147 See Shepsle, supra note 6, at 244-45 (“[T]here is not a single legislative intent, but rather many 
legislators’ intents.  Congress is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’  Legislator A may have voted for an 
amendment that ultimately became part of the winning policy because he favored the ‘plain 
meaning’ of the text.  Legislator B, on the other hand, may have voted for it because he thought 
(incorrectly as it turned out) that the amendment would undermine support for the final bill or 
draw a presidential veto, thereby allowing the status quo ante to survive.  Finally, Legislators C, 
D, and E may have supported the amendment, disinterestedly, as a reasonable compromise 
among competing interests.” (footnote omitted)). 
148 See id. at 241-44 (constructing Arrowian dilemma around intransitivity of substantive policy 
preferences). 
149 See Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in 
Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427 (2005). 
150 See id. at 447 (“While committees will often be at the center of this inquiry, this will not always 
be the case.  Sometimes, for example, the administration may propose legislation through 
members of Congress.  When that happens, the relevant committees may adopt statements from 
the executive branch as reflecting the bill’s purpose.  In other instances, the bill’s journey through 
committees, floor debate and conference is complicated, with particular moments in the process 
being crucial to passage of the bill.” (footnotes omitted)). 
HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS  8/1/2016 1:59 PM 
31 
 
a trip but I leave to you the choice of destination.151  In either case, members of 
the collective share a “we” intention that commits them to something specific 
without ever having to contemplate—let alone prefer or intend—that specific 
thing. 
 
D.  New Skepticism 
 
 Congress does sometimes act as an “it.”  When Congress takes an up-
or-down vote on a particular bill, for example, its members share a conditional 
intention that “we” approve the bill in question if it receives the requisite 
number of votes.  For a member to cast her vote with this intention is just for 
her to cast her vote intentionally.152  Likewise, when the House or the Senate 
votes on a proposed rule of legislative procedure, its members share an intention 
that “we” adopt the rule if sufficiently many members vote in favor.  This much 
is clear.  Less clear is whether Congress, qua “it,” sometimes enacts a bill for 
some purpose or intends that a textual provision have some specific meaning.  This 
Part suggests that not.  Or at least not with any systematicity. 
 
 Again, on the account of shared agency just sketched, to say that 
Congress as such intends to φ is just to say that (sufficiently many of) its 
members share an intention that “we” φ.  As the above discussion suggests, this 
can come about in one of two ways.  First, members can share a direct intention 
that “we” φ.  Second, members can share a direct intention that “we” θ that 
commits them indirectly to an intention that “we” φ. 
 
To illustrate, consider the recent dispute in King v. Burwell153 over the 
phrase “Exchange established by the State,” as used in § 36B of the Internal 
Revenue Code (“IRC”), enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (“ACA”).154  Opponents of the ACA argued that, as used, “Exchange 
established by the State” could only be read to refer just to healthcare exchanges 
established by one of the fifty states or the District of Columbia.155  In response, 
the Government argued that “the ACA’s structure and purpose all evince 
Congress’s intent” that the phrase refer to “both state-run and federally-
facilitated Exchanges.”156  Per the above, one of two conditions must obtain for 
                                                 
151 See id. at 439-40. 
152 Put another way, to cast one’s vote without this intention would be to evince a basic 
misunderstanding of voting procedure. 
153 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
154 26 U.S.C. § 36B. 
155 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015). 
156 King v. Sebelius, 2014 WL 1028988 (C.A.4), 13 (quoting Halbig v. Sebelius, No. CV 13-0623 
(PLF), 2014 WL 129023, at *17 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2014) rev’d and remanded sub nom. Halbig v. 
HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS  8/1/2016 1:59 PM 
32 
 
the Government’s claim to have been true: 1) when enacting the ACA, members 
of Congress shared a direct intention that, by “Exchange established by the 
State,” “we” mean exchanges established by the states or the federal 
government; or 2) members shared some other direct intention (e.g., an 
intention that the ACA be interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
assumptions underlying the corresponding CBO score157) that committed them 
indirectly to this reading. 
 
Appeal to direct intention is, as a rule, hopeless for purposes of 
substantiating an attribution of legislative intent.  As an empirical matter, 
member of Congress “don’t read text,”158 let alone form communicative 
intentions as to (or understandings of159) specific textual provisions.  Further, 
because members act at the behest of different constituencies, it is rare for 
members to agree160 upon reasons for action (outside of preambles, at least161). 
 
This leaves appeal to indirect commitment.  Various scholars have 
pursued this approach in recent years.  For the most part, these are the same 
scholars who have urged courts, when engaging in interpretation, to pay greater 
attention to “how Congress really works.”162  Such scholars appeal to indirect 
commitments of one of two sorts.  The first is commitments resulting from 
members’ acceptance of formal norms.  The second is commitments resulting 
from members’ adherence to informal norms.  For the reasons below, both 
approaches fail. 
 
1.  Formal Norms 
 
 On occasion, Congress plausibly commits itself indirectly to a 
communicative intention by adopting some formal norm such as an enacted 
procedural rule.  For example, as Victoria Nourse observes, both the House and 
the Senate have a rule that prohibits conference committees from altering of the 
                                                 
Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014) reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated, No. 14-5018, 
2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014)). 
157 See Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 22, at 782. 
158 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 972. 
159 At least some participants in the drafting process seem to understand statutory meaning as 
‘objective,’ i.e. as determined apart from the subjective intentions of drafters.  See, e.g., Jarrod 
Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. 807, 831 (2014) (observing that legislative counsel “view their role as ensuring [textual] 
clarity”). 
160 In the sense of coordinate. 
161 See infra notes 173-178 and accompanying text. 
162 Nourse, supra note 1, at 143; accord Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 909; 
KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 8. 
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text of a bill where the two chambers have agreed to the same language.163  From 
this procedural rule, Nourse rightly infers that, where post-conference language 
(e.g., “utilized”) differs from agreed upon pre-conference language (e.g., 
“established”), Congress is committed—where plausible164—to the intention 
that the former communicate something substantially similar to that that was 
communicated by the latter.165  And, as Nourse appears to recognize, this 
commitment to pre-/post-conference consistency will entail a commitment to 
a discernable communicative intention if the intention expressed by pre-
conference language is itself discernable (e.g., where one can tell what Congress 
meant—or at least did not mean166—with that language).167 
 
 Nourse goes on to suggest that attention to the formal norms of 
legislative procedure renders both unmysterious and unproblematic the search 
for legislative intent.  None of Nourse’s other examples, however, support that 
generalization.  Nourse argues, for instance, that various procedural rules (e.g., 
cloture rules) dictate which stages of the legislative process (e.g., pre-filibuster 
compromise) are “important point[s] of textual decision.”168  From this, Nourse 
infers that the legislative history most proximate to some such decision (e.g., the 
inclusion of specific language) will, other things equal, shed the most light on 
legislative intent as it pertains to that decision.169  Legislative history consists just 
of non-binding statements or reports prepared by (or on behalf of) some 
individual member or subset of members.  By assuming uncritically that 
legislative history is probative of legislative intent, Nourse thus shifts without 
remark from intent qua shared indirect commitment to intent qua what was likely in the 
                                                 
163 See Nourse, supra note 1, at 94 & n.97 (“Conference committees cannot—repeat, cannot—
change the text of a bill where both houses have agreed to the same language.” (citing Rules of 
the House of Representatives, H.R. Doc. No. 111-157, R. XXII (9), at 37 (2011); Standing Rules 
of the Senate, S. Doc. No. 112-1, R. XXVIII (2a), at 52 (2011))). 
164 In cases where the rule was plainly violated, one cannot plausibly attribute to Congress such 
an intention. 
165 See id. at 96 (“A faithful member of Congress would assume that, when both houses pass the 
same language, any added language must be read as making no substantive change in the bill.”). 
166 If, for example, pre-conference language plainly precluded a particular reading, one could 
infer that Congress did not intend that reading post-conference.  This would be true regardless 
of whether pre-conference language was in some other way unclear. 
167 See id. (“If the ambiguity is created in conference committee, … then the court may resolve 
the ambiguity by conforming to Congress’s own rules.” (emphasis added)). 
168 Id. at 98.  Here, Nourse builds upon prior work in positive political science.  See McNollgast, 
Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 3 (1994) (purporting to “identify aspects of the legislative history that are more reliably 
informative about the intent of the majority coalition that enacted a statute” through the 
identification of “veto gates”); McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 99 (same). 
169 See Nourse, supra note 1, at 110 (“[T]he best legislative history is the history most proximate 
to text, rather than a particular type of report or statement ….”). 
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head of a member at the time of decision to the extent she was paying attention.170  There is, 
of course, no guarantee (and strong reason to doubt) that all or a majority of 
members are paying attention at the time of any given decision.171  Therefore, 
absent some unmentioned shared informal commitment to, say, treating as 
authoritative the view of some individual member or set of members, Nourse 
offers no reason to share her confidence that attention to cloture rules will reveal 
shared intentions.  Each of Nourse’s additional arguments (e.g., that statements 
by legislative “winners” are more probative than statements by “losers”172) 
suffers from this defect. 
 
 Congress also sometimes commits itself to communicative intentions 
via statute.  The Dictionary Act in Title 1 of the United States Code, for example, 
contains various rules of construction that inform “the meaning of any Act of 
Congress.”173  Because it has committed itself to these rules, one can attribute 
to Congress, other things equal,174 the intention to “include the future as well as 
the present” where it has used the present tense .175  So too, where it has used 
the term “person,” one can attribute to Congress the intention to refer to 
“include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, 
and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”176  In addition to the 
Dictionary Act, Congress makes liberal use of definitions sections within 
specific statutes.  Hence, when interpreting Title 18, one can attribute to 
Congress, where it uses the term “United States” in a “territorial sense,” the 
intention to refer to “all places and waters, continental or insular, subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States, except the Canal Zone.”177  Last, in terms of 
broader practical intentions, Congress does sometimes commit itself to such 
intentions via preamble.  When interpreting some provision of the Animal 
Welfare Act, for instance, one can attribute to Congress the background intent 
of “[e]nsur[ing] that animals intended for use in research facilities … are 
provided humane care and treatment.”178 
 
                                                 
170 In other words, to the extent that committee reports et al. are non-binding, such sources are, 
at best, probative of how a given member understood the corresponding text as a historical 
matter.   
171 See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text. 
172 Nourse, supra note 1, at 118-19. 
173 1 U.S.C. § 1. 
174 The Dictionary Act’s rules of construction are framed as default rules, i.e. as rules that apply 
“unless the context indicates otherwise.”  Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 18 U.S.C. § 5. 
178 7 U.S.C. § 2131. 
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 Unfortunately, definitions sections179 and preambles only get one so far.  
Setting aside the old problem that one must interpret definitions sections and 
preambles,180 such provisions plainly do not—and could not plausibly181—
ground the array of intent attributions described in Part I. 
 
 In sum, appeal to formal norms adopted by Congress fails as a general 
method for substantiating attributions of legislative intent. 
 
2.  Informal Norms 
 
 Appeal to informal legislative norms fares no better.  First, judicial 
recognition of a non-obvious legislative norms would plausibly conflict with fair 
notice.  Particularly so with the informal norms alleged.  Second, recent 
empirical studies of the legislative drafting process support skepticism about 
intent attributable to Congress via informal norm. 
 
 What is an informal legislative norm?  For present purposes, an informal 
norm is just a recognized norm with no formal basis.182  Consider, for example, 
the norm in soccer that a player kick the ball out of bounds if a player from the 
opposing team is injured.  This norm appears nowhere in the FIFA rulebook 
but is widely recognized by both players and fans.  It is, therefore, an informal 
norm of the sport.183  An informal legislative norm, in turn, is just a norm 
recognized but not formally adopted by Congress as such.  The norm that a 
home senator retains veto power over a judicial nominee, for example, has no 
                                                 
179 In effect, the Dictionary Act is a definitions section for the entire United States Code. 
180 Cf. Fallon, Three Symmetries, supra note 85, at 711 (observing that “if a theory … tried to 
incorporate within itself rules for its own application, then someone could always demand to 
see the principles specifying how those prescriptions should in turn be interpreted”); LUDWIG 
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 217 (G.E.M. Anscombe ed., 1991) 
(“‘How am I able to obey a rule?’—if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the 
justification for my following the rule in the way I do.  If I have exhausted the justifications I 
have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned.  Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply what 
I do.’”). 
181 Congress could not, for instance, simply define away the range of conceivable Travis case. 
182 Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1181 (2013) 
(contrasting informal “conventions” with “formal legal rules”). 
183 See Nate Scott, Italian Soccer Game Has Heartwarming Display of Sportsmanship, USA TODAY 
SPORTS (March 20, 2014), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2014/03/soccer-game-italian-serie-d-
sportmanship (“A player for [Team A] was injured, so [Team B] kicked the ball out of bounds 
to allow him to get treatment.  As is customary in soccer, [Team A] then threw the ball in and 
gave the ball back to [Team B]’s goalkeeper.”). 
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basis in statute or formal procedural rule.  It is, nonetheless, recognized by 
members as binding.184 
 
 Various accounts of legislative intent are built upon appeal to informal 
legislative norms.  Such accounts claim that members of Congress share 
intentions to delegate the task of authoring legislation.  In turn, members are 
alleged to be committed, albeit informally, to regarding the intentions of their 
delegates as authoritative.  Solan, for example, claims that Congress delegates to 
“subplanners” the task of giving “content” to particular bills.185  Often but not 
always the subplanners in question are originating congressional committees.186  
According to Solan, members of Congress share a “general recognition that those 
who ushered [a] bill through the process did so with particular [intentions] that 
deserve to be honored.”187  From this, Solan infers, among other things, that 
“the historical record of a committee … that developed the details of a statute 
is typically useful evidence of that subgroup’s, and thus the entire group’s, intent.”188  
Similarly, Judge Katzmann reasons that courts should consider legislative history 
because so doing “can aid the judge in understanding how the legislation’s 
congressional proponents wanted the statute to work, what problems they sought to 
address, what purposes they sought to achieve, and what methods they 
employed to secure those purposes.”189  Judge Katzmann goes on to assert that 
“[w]hen Congress passes a law, it can be said to incorporate the materials that it 
or at least the law’s principal sponsors (and others who worked to secure enactment) 
deem useful in interpreting the law.”190  Judge Katzmann infers this informal 
commitment to incorporation from the “substantial control” over the legislative 
process afforded to “particular legislators,” including “committee chairs, floor 
managers, and party leaders.”191  Gluck and Bressman likewise argue that that 
“faithful-agent judges” should use legislative history to discern the intentions of 
“legislative drafters,” i.e. those members and staffers most responsible for 
putting together a particular bill.192  Gluck and Bressman go on to advocate 
various interpretive rules (e.g., that a statute be interpreted in accordance with 
the assumptions underlying the corresponding CBO score, that a statute drafted 
                                                 
184 See MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32013, THE HISTORY OF THE 
BLUE SLIP IN THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 1917-PRESENT (2003). 
185 Solan, supra note 149, at 448-49. 
186 See id. at 447. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 35. 
190 Id. at 48; see also id. at 38 (characterizing committee reports and conference committee reports 
as “authoritative materials”). 
191 Id. at 48-49. 
192 E.g., Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 959. 
HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS  8/1/2016 1:59 PM 
37 
 
by a committee be construed to preserve that committee’s jurisdiction193) 
supposed to approximate the intentions of those “doing the drafting.”194  Gluck 
and Bressman equate without argument the intentions of drafters and those of 
Congress as such. 
 
 The above accounts give rise to two concerns.195  First, greater attention 
to “how Congress really works” supports skepticism about legislative intent via 
delegation.  Assume arguendo that Congress intends to delegate authorship to 
“drafters.”  In the simple case, a committee drafts a bill.  Both chambers then 
adopt that bill without amendment.  Here, whatever intentions are attributable 
to the committee are attributable to Congress as such.  But how to determine 
what intentions are attributable to the committee?  Beyond looking at the 
statutory text, the traditional answer is: read the committee report.196  That 
answer is difficult to square, however, with survey responses showing 
differences of opinion amongst drafters as to whether such reports are 
                                                 
193 See Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 22, at 781, 782. 
194 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 946; see also id. at 989(“Courts rather easily might 
implement many of our respondents’ insights related to the different types of legislative history, 
for example: distinguish between omnibus and appropriations legislative history; entrench the 
inconsistently applied doctrine that committee reports are the most reliable history; pay more 
attention to markups; and place more weight on scripted colloquies or other documents issued 
jointly by committee leaders of opposing parties.”). 
195 In addition to the concerns voiced here, delegation-based accounts of legislative intent have 
been subject to non-delegation critique.  As mentioned above, Article I, § 1 vests all legislative 
power in Congress as such.  See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.  According to Justice 
Scalia, “[i]t has always been assumed that these powers are nondelegable—or, as John Locke 
put it, that legislative power consists of the power ‘to make laws, … not to make legislators.’”  
Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 87 (R. Cox ed.1982)).  
Sharpening the critique, John Manning argues that “legislative self-delegation poses a particularly 
acute danger to [the Article I, § 7 requirements of] bicameralism and presentment and is 
unconstitutional per se.”  John F. Manning, Textualsim as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 673, 676 (1997) [hereinafter Manning, Nondelegation] (emphasis added).  Manning reasons 
that when a court “gives authoritative weight to,” say, “a committee’s subjective understanding 
of statutory meaning (announced outside the statutory text), it empowers Congress to specify 
statutory details—without the structurally-mandated cost of getting two Houses of Congress 
and the President to approve them.”  Id. at 707. 
This non-delegation critique, however, rests on the premise that Congress votes on 
legislative text, not ‘drafter’s’ understanding thereof.  But, to the extent that ‘drafter’s 
understanding’ is just something like speaker meaning, that contrast is difficult to sustain for the 
reasons articulated in Part I. 
196 See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (“[T]he authoritative source for finding 
the Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which ‘represen[t] the 
considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and 
studying proposed legislation.’” (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969))). 
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reliable.197  So too with the concession by drafters in those same surveys that 
committee reports are used sometimes “to include ‘something we couldn’t get 
in the statute’ in order ‘to make key stakeholders happy.’”198  Further, because 
the majority party drafts the report, “[t]his puts [it] in a position to be able to 
use [its] control of legislative history to sneak in [its] preferred interpretation 
even if it goes against the bargains that [it] made with the minority party to 
achieve passage.”199 
 
Consider next a more complex (and more realistic) case.  Some 
committee drafts a bill.  Prior to adoption, various amendments are made on the 
floor.  Whose intentions are attributable to Congress here?  The naïve response 
is that the committee’s intentions are attributable as to the un-amended portions 
of the bill and that the intentions of amendment authors are attributable as to 
the portions amended.200  This is too quick.  Because a bill is read as a whole, 
amended portions shape one’s reading of un-amended portions and vice 
versa.201  For this reason, one must, to make sense of a whole bill, attribute a 
coherent set of practical and communicative intentions to its author(s).  But 
how?  Committee member and amendment authors need not coordinate 
                                                 
197 Perhaps unsurprisingly, drafters responsible for committee reports regard those reports more 
highly than those not.  Compare Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 977-78 (reporting 
that most committee staffers regard committee reports as either “very reliable” or “reliable”) 
with Shobe, supra note 159, at 848 (reporting that legislative counsel—responsible for statutory 
text but not legislative history—regard committee staffers as having difficulty articulating policy 
goals clearly); see also Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 978 (recognizing “potential 
bias” of committee staffers in favor of committee work product). 
198 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 973; see also Schobe, supra note 159, at 870; Victoria 
F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 607 (2002) (“As one staffer put it: ‘[T]o maintain agreement, people often 
prefer to leave language ambiguous and put things in legislative history.’”). 
199 Schobe, supra note 159, at 870.  As Schobe goes on to explain, “While [the majority party’s] 
duplicity could cost them credibility, it will often not be revealed until many years later—if at 
all—when the case is litigated.”  Id.  Gluck and Bressman anticipate this concern, emphasizing 
that committee reports and other group-produced legislative “often convey bipartisan, 
multimember understandings.  See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 978.  For the 
reasons explained below, however, even in cases where a committee report reflects a bipartisan 
consensus among committee members, the question remains how to integrate that consensus with 
the attitudes of non-committee members. 
200 Because the amendments occur after committee, the committee need not form intentions as 
to their purpose or meaning.  Nor is there an apparent reason to privilege committee intentions 
formed after a bill reaches the floor. 
201 By analogy, suppose a studio contracts with A to write a screenplay.  Dissatisfied, the studio 
then contracts with B to rewrite the ending.  B’s new ending will influence the audience’s 
interpretation of early scenes despite her having left those scenes unaltered.  Likewise, the early 
scenes will influence the audience’s interpretation of the new ending. 
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intentions.  And how to reconcile conflicting, uncoordinated intentions 
(whether policy or communicative) is unclear.202 
 
 Return now to the initial assumption that members share an intention 
to delegate.  What is clear is that members share an intention to delegate to other 
members and staffers the drafting of proposed legislation, i.e. the putting of finger 
to keyboard.  Also clear is that members depend on other members and staffers 
for information about what proposed legislation does.  Less clear is whether 
members share an intention to delegate to other members or staffers authorship 
of proposed legislation in the sense of authoritative understanding thereof.  For 
example, in the course of arguing against a “text-focused approach” to 
interpretation,203 Gluck and Bressman claim that “[i]t is not uncommon to hear 
that a group of elected officials has reached a ‘deal’ before pen is put to paper.”204  
As evidence, Gluck and Bressman cite a complaint by Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) 
that “a gun bill was being debated even as ‘not a single senator ha[d] been 
provided the legislative language.’”205  Senator Lee’s complaint only makes sense, 
of course, if proposed legislation consists of “legislative language” as opposed 
to some extra-textual “deal.”  More to the point, it only makes sense if he regards 
himself as free to interpret that “language” himself.  Again, this is of a piece with 
members making floor statements that conflict with committee reports and the 
like. 
 
 Taken together, the above provides ample reason for skepticism about 
intent via delegation.  It is doubtful that members share an intention to delegate 
authorship.  And, even if Congress so intends, the intentions of delegates are 
unknowable or unformed.   
 
In the above respects, Congress thus contrasts sharply with a typical 
corporation.  Various scholars reason that attributing intentions to Congress is 
                                                 
202 Add to this the practical complication that the legislative history generated with respect to 
floor amendments is alleged to be poor. 
203 In particular, an approach to interpretation that considers text at a “granular” level.  Gluck 
& Bressman, Part II, supra note 22, at 743 (“This is not to say that members and staff do not 
care about text …. Rather, it is to say that micro-level legal disputes over what is often a single 
word in a lengthy statute may be improperly focused ….”); see also Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect 
Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress's Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. 
L. REV. 62, 64 (2015) [hereinafter Gluck, Imperfect Statutes] (arguing that “[w]hereas  the  Court’s  
recent  statutory  interpretation  jurisprudence  has been  marked  by  a  targeted  focus  on  a  
few  contested  words,  King [v. Burwell] responds  by  looking  at  the  full  picture,  at  
Congress’s  ‘plan’”). 
204 Id. at 740. 
205 Jennifer Bendery, Gun Bill Vote: Senate Overcomes GOP Filibuster Effort to Begin Debate, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/11/gun-bill-
vote_n_3061275.html. 
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unproblematic because we freely attribute intentions to corporations and other 
multi-member bodies.206  In the case of corporations, intent attribution is often 
unproblematic because corporations are, generally speaking, hierarchical 
organizations with clear allocations of decisionmaking authority.  Because, for 
example, a corporation’s general counsel has decisionmaking authority with 
respect to the corporation’s legal strategy, the general counsel’s intentions with 
respect to legal strategy are, as a rule, attributable to the corporation as a 
whole.207  In this way, the typical corporation is quite unlike Congress.  Contrary 
to the suggestion of many, a bill’s primary sponsors do not appear to enjoy the 
sort of widely recognized delegation of authority as does a general counsel. 
 
Second, judicial recognition of non-obvious informal legislative norms 
would plausibly conflict with fair notice.  As a constitutional matter, “laws which 
regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or 
required.”208  This means, at a minimum, that information necessary to 
understanding a law must be publicly available209 and that guidance concerning 
the content of the law must not be misleading.210  As a normative matter, notice 
is required by “[e]lementary notions of fairness.”211  It is also “recognized as an 
essential element of the rule of law.”212  Quite plausibly, “blame and punishment 
                                                 
206 See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 1, at 86 (“If lawyers find no difficulty in understanding the 
complexities of other collective entities, such as corporations or administrative agencies, one 
wonders why it is too difficult to understand Congress.”); BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY 
WORK, supra note 114, at 99 (“It is not conceptually difficult, however, to attribute a purpose to 
a corporate body such as Congress.  Corporations, companies, partnerships, ... and legislatures 
engage in intentional activities ....”).   
207 Delegation also explains attributions of intent to judicial opinions of multimember courts. 
See Nourse, supra note 1, at 74 (“[Lawyers] do not charge the multimember Supreme Court with 
having no ‘intent’ and, from this premise, dismiss judicial opinions as if the Court had made no 
decision.”).  Because courts delegate authorship of an opinion to a particular judge or justice in 
most cases, the intentions of the authoring judge or justice are attributable to the court as a 
whole. 
208 F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012). 
209 See Caleb Nelson, A Response to Professor Manning, 91 VA. L. REV. 451, 470 (2005) (“There is a 
consensus, for instance, that the people subject to a statute should have fair notice of the law’s 
requirements; that is why even intentionalists restrict themselves to publicly available materials 
when trying to discern what the enacting legislature meant.” (emphasis added)). 
210  See Fox, 132 S. Ct. at 2312-14, 2318 (holding that broadcasters lacked fair notice that 
prohibition against broadcast of “obscene, indecent, or profane language” applied to “fleeting” 
expletives where agency policy at time of broadcast indicated that prohibition applied only 
“repeated” expletives). 
211 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (“Elementary notions of fairness 
enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice … of the 
conduct that will subject him to punishment ....”). 
212 Note, Textualism As Fair Notice, 123 HARV. L. REV. 542, 543 (2009); accord Papachristou v. 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (“Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, 
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presuppose that [an] agent had a fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing.”213  So too 
a rule of law, which ensures an “opportunity to know what the law is and to 
conform [one’s] conduct accordingly.”214 
 
Recognition of certain informal norms is plainly consistent with fair 
notice.  Some such norms are obvious.  The norm that legislation be written in 
English, for example, has no formal basis but is widely recognized by members 
of Congress and by interpreters, both professional and lay.215  Because the norms 
is so obvious, one would be hard-pressed to say that a “person of ordinary 
intelligence”216 lacks notice of its operation.217  Contrast this, however, with the 
alleged norm that a statute is to be interpreted in accordance with the 
understanding of its principal sponsors.  Members routinely make floor 
statement that “disavow[] the committee’s or sponsor’s interpretation.”218  In so 
doing, those members implicitly repudiate the alleged delegatory norm.  Assume 
for the moment these statements are subterfuge.  Even still, it would be 
                                                 
one of which is that ‘[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or 
forbids’” (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939))). 
213 David O. Brink & Dana K. Nelkin, Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility, in 1 OXFORD 
STUDIES IN AGENCY AND RESPONSIBILITY 284, 285 (David Shoemaker ed., 2013) (emphasis 
added). 
214 Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994); accord Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory 
of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEX. L. REV. 425, 471 (1982) (“The rule of law … is a defeasible 
entitlement of persons to have their behavior governed by rules publicly fixed in advance.”). 
215 See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of 
Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 101 n.9 (2003) (“[T]extualists assume that … 
statutes are written in English.  But no text by itself declares the language in which it is written.  
Rather, the context—English-speaking authors writing to direct an English-speaking 
audience—shows that English was the language intended.” (citations omitted)). 
216 Fox, 132 S. Ct. at 2317 (“A conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the 
statute or regulation under which it is obtained ‘fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence 
fair notice of what is prohibited.’” (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008))); 
accord Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (“[B]ecause we assume that man is 
free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act 
accordingly.”). 
217 The same can probably be said of the various “linguistic” canons that interpreting courts 
apply.  See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS __ (2012) (discussing what the authors refer to as “semantic” and “syntactic” 
canons).  Because those canons are just approximations of the usage norms of ordinary English, 
the general norm that statutes in English plausibly entails the more specific norm that, for 
example, those same statutes conform to the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.  Gluck 
and Bressman observe that drafters report varying degrees of compliance with the linguistic 
canons.  See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 932.  Because such canons are best 
understood as rules of thumb, as opposed to rigid prescriptions, such varied compliance is 
compatible with the thesis that statutes conform to those canons generally. 
218 Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 195, at 721 & n.207 (collecting cases).  
HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS  8/1/2016 1:59 PM 
42 
 
troubling to say that citizens have notice of a norm the existence of which 
officials deny.219  Add to this the recent finding that a sponsor’s understanding 
is often informed by “‘inside information’ that may be unknowable to courts or 
litigants,”220 and the fair notice concern becomes greater still.221 
 
For the above reasons, appeal to informal norms also fails as a method 
for substantiating attributions of legislative intent. 
III.  LEGISLATIVE INTENT AS FICTION, OR THE IRRELEVANCE OF 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
 
So claims about legislative intent are systematically false if taken literally.  
This Part argues that such claims are, therefore, best understood as involving a 
useful fiction.  The fiction this Part posits is that legislation is written by a generic 
author.  So understood, a claim about legislative intent is apt if and only if one 
would make that claim about a generic author on the basis of her having written 
the legislation at issue in the context of enactment. 
  
A.  Fictionalism 
 
Fictionalism about a particular discourse is the thesis that claims within 
that discourse are best understood not as aiming at the literal truth but rather as 
involving a useful fiction.222  When children play cops and robbers, for example, 
utterances such as “Mary has a gun!” or “The money is in the vault!” involve an 
obvious pretense.  Hence it being unembarrassing that Mary carries a twig, not 
a firearm.  Within such a discourse, utterances are still apt or inapt;223 thus it 
                                                 
219 Cf. id. at 720 (expressing concern that, “because the Court has stated that it will treat 
committee reports and sponsor’s statements as more ‘authoritative’ than ordinary floor 
statements, individual legislators can even take to the floor and make statements disavowing the 
committee’s or sponsor’s interpretation, without precluding judicial reliance on the history 
produced by the more ‘authoritative’ legislative actors” (footnotes omitted)). 
220 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 985. 
221 Cf. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 658 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (“Indeed, it is not unlike the practice of Caligula, who 
reportedly ‘wrote his laws in a very small character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the 
more effectually to ensnare the people.’” (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 46 (1765))). 
222 See Roth, supra note 124. 
223 In other words, to say that a discourse involves a useful fiction is not to say that, within that 
discourse, anything goes. 
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mattering whether Mary is in possession of the twig.  It is just that aptness is 
determined by pretense in combination with facts on the ground.224 
 
Fictionalism is often motivated by the concern that a discourse would 
suffer from a systematic defect if claims within it aimed at literal truth.225  That 
concern might be metaphysical or epistemological.  In the case of cops and 
robbers, the concern is metaphysical.  Within the discourse, children appear to 
refer to objects that do not exist (e.g., money, vaults, guns).  As such, claims 
within the discourse would be systematically false if attempts at literal truth.  
Contrast this with children discussing a plan to unearth buried treasure in the 
backyard.  Here, if taken literally, claims within the discourse would be 
systematically unwarranted even if true (while the yard might contain buried 
treasure, the children have no way of knowing226).  In each case, appeal to pretense 
explains away the would-be defect.227 
 
 Fictionalism can be hermeneutic or revolutionary.228  Hermeneutic 
fictionalism is the thesis that a discourse involves a pretense.229  Revolutionary 
fictionalism is the thesis that it should.230  With cops and robbers, hermeneutic 
fictionalism is plainly true.  Children do not, for instance, mistake a twig for a 
gun once the game has come to an end.  Contrast this, however, with a child’s 
talk about her imaginary friend.  Here, it might be unclear whether the child 
regards her friend as imaginary.  If not, hermeneutic fictionalism as to her talk 
is false.  Revolutionary fictionalism, however, is probably true.  The child can 
                                                 
224 See, e.g., Stephen Yablo, Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?, 72 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 229, 
247 (1998) (offering a pretense-based account of truth within a fiction); Kendall Walton, 
Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe, 1 EURO. J. PHIL. 39, 46 (1993) (same). 
225 See Jason Stanley, Hermeneutic Fictionalism, in MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY VOLUME 
XXV: FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE 36 (Peter A. French & Howard Wettstein eds., 2001) (“On a 
fictionalist view, engaging in discourse that involves apparent reference to a realm of 
problematic entities is best viewed as engaging in a pretense.”). 
226 See, e.g., JOHN HAWTHORNE, KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIES 23 (2004) (“The practice of 
assertion is constituted by the rule/requirement that one assert something only if one knows 
it.”); TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS 243 (2000) (defending the 
“knowledge rule,” i.e. the rule that “[o]ne must: assert p only if one knows p”).  While not all 
philosophers accept the knowledge norm of assertion, it is common ground that the norm(s) of 
assertion relate to epistemic access to the proposition asserted.  See, e.g., Jennifer Lackey, Norms 
of Assertion, 41 NOÛS 594 (2007) (defending the “reasonable to believe” norm of assertion). 
227 In other words, fictionalism is a charitable reconstruction of an otherwise defective discourse. 
228 JOHN P. BURGESS & GIDEON ROSEN, A SUBJECT WITH NO OBJECT: STRATEGIES FOR 
NOMINALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF MATHEMATICS 6 (1999) (observing distinction). 
229 Id. (“On what may be called the hermeneutic conception, the claim is … , ‘All anyone really 
means—all the words really mean—is . . .’”). 
230 Id. (“On what may be called the revolutionary conception, the goal is reconstruction or 
revision.”). 
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and should231 continue her friendship (and, in turn, her talk about that friendship) 
as a game of make-believe.232 
 
B.  Fictionalism About Legislative Intent 
 
 Fictionalism about legislative intent is the thesis that claims about intent 
are best understood as involving a pretense.  More specifically, fictionalism is 
the thesis that such claims involve the pretense that legislation is written by some 
author or other.  As explained in Part I, intent attribution is necessary if 
legislation is to be an effective means of communication.  For that reason, 
simply abandoning discourse about legislative intent is not a serious option.  As 
explained in Part II, the primary motivation for fictionalism is the metaphysical 
concern that legislation has no author.233  If legislation has no author, then claims 
about legislative intent are systematically false if taken literally.  Appeal to the 
pretense of a generic author explains away this defect.234  Understood as 
involving this pretense, a claim about legislative intent is apt if and only if one 
would make that claim about a generic author on the basis of her having written 
the legislation at issue in the context of enactment. 
 
 Why a generic author?  Intent claims are made in relation to a context of 
enactment.  A context of enactment consists of information from which one 
can draw inferences about an author about whom one knows nothing otherwise.  
Just from the fact that one is interpreting a federal statute, for example, one can 
infer that its author has written legislation as opposed to satire.  Likewise, one 
can infer that the statute’s author has written in English, given the obvious 
convention of so doing.235  More generally, a context of enactment provides 
enough information to make sense of what an author is doing.  For this reason, 
appeal to the pretense of a generic author is enough to make sense of discourse 
about legislative intent.  Appeal to the pretense of, say, a “reasonable legislator” 
                                                 
231 See, e.g., Paige E. Davis, Elizabeth Meinsb, & Charles Fernyhough, Individual Differences in 
Children’s Private Speech: The Role of Imaginary Companions, 116 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 
561 (2013) (finding that children who had imaginary companions were more likely to engage in 
covert private speech). 
232 Discourse about a child’s imaginary friend thus contrasts with discourse about ghosts or 
phlogiston, which one probably does best to abandon. 
233 A secondary motivation for fictionalism about legislative intent is the epistemological concern 
that, even if legislation has an author, its author’s intentions are unknowable.  See supra notes 
196-199 and accompanying text.  If an author’s intentions are unknowable, then claims about 
legislative intent are systematically unwarranted if aimed at literal truth.  See supra note 226. 
234 Appeal to this pretense also explains away the abovementioned epistemological defect 
because it renders legislative intent knowable by definition, i.e. on a fictionalist approach 
legislative intent just is what one would have reason to believe it to be. 
235 See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
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is, for this reason, unnecessary.236  One can thus avoid the political philosophical 
judgments such an appeal might entail.237 
 
So understood, fictionalism about intent is a refinement of “objectified 
intent,” as invoked by some textualists.  According to Manning, “[l]egislative 
intent, to the extent textualists invoke it, is a framework of analysis designed to 
satisfy the minimum conditions for meaningful communication by a multi-
member body without actual intentions to judges, administrators, and the public, 
who all form a community of shared conventions for decoding language in 
context.”238  As Manning goes on to explain, “textualists focus on ‘objectified 
intent,’” i.e. “the import that a reasonable person conversant with applicable 
social and linguistic conventions would attach to the enacted words.”239  As 
discussed above, textualists sometimes unreasonably restrict context to so-called 
“semantic context.”240  And, as explained below, textualists sometimes 
misidentify the epistemic position(s) that determine what information context 
                                                 
236 E.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
885, 895 (2003) (observing that “[p]urposivism usually attributes goals or aims by envisioning 
reasonable legislators acting reasonably”); see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, 
THE LEGAL PROCESS 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) 
(recommending that courts interpret statutes under the presumption that the legislature is “made 
of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably”). 
237 Given a minimalist gloss, the ‘reasonable legislator’ collapses into the generic author.  A 
generic author is presumptively reasonable in the sense that a listener assumes, other things 
equal, that a speaker has complied with the operative conversational norms.  See Kent Bach, 
Speech Acts and Pragmatics, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 155 
(Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley eds., 2006) (“The listener presumes that the speaker is being 
cooperative and is speaking truthfully, informatively, relevantly, perspicuously, and otherwise 
appropriately.  If an utterance superficially appears not to conform to this presumption, the 
listener looks for a way of taking the utterance so that it does conform.”).  And, because she is 
the author of legislation, a generic author is a legislator just in that sense.  Given a non-minimalist 
gloss, however, the ‘reasonable legislator’ can diverge from the generic author in one of two 
ways.  First, one can apply to the ‘reasonable legislator’ a stronger presumption of reasonableness 
than would one to a run-of-the-mill interlocutor (e.g., a super-strong presumption against 
misstatement, see United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he sine qua non of any ‘scrivener’s error’ doctrine, it seems to me, is that the 
meaning genuinely intended but inadequately expressed must be absolutely clear; otherwise we 
might be rewriting the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake.” (emphasis added))).  
See Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 15, at 604 (“When ordinary speakers leave crucial 
contingencies unaddressed, when they unwittingly undertake inconsistent commitments, or 
when what they advocate transparently defeats the goals of their advocacy, we do not pretend 
that Beneficient Providence has filled every gap, removed every contradiction, and rationalized 
every linguistic performance.”).  Second, one might build in to the idea a philosophically robust 
conception of ‘legislator’ (e.g., a delegate or a trustee conception). 
238 Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 11,. at 434. 
239 Id. at 424. 
240 See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text. 
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includes.241  Still, the pretense of a generic author both captures and renders 
more precise the basic textualist insight that legislative intent is just the intent 
that one would attribute to the author of legislation as such. 
 
Fictionalism is thus similar to but importantly different from the sort of 
minimalism about legislative intent defended by Joseph Raz and others.  Raz 
argues that, when a legislator votes on some text, she does so with the minimal—
and presumably shared—intention that the text be read in accordance with “the 
[interpretive] conventions prevailing at the time.”242  Jeremey Waldron likewise 
assures that a legislator casts her vote “on the assumption that—to put it 
crudely—what the words mean to him is identical to what they will mean to 
those to whom they are addressed (in the event that the provision is passed).”243  
Understood in one way, such claims are uncontroversial but uninformative: To 
say that a member intends a text to be read in accordance with “prevailing” 
conventions is plausibly just to say that the member regards the conventions she 
intends as prevailing.  Likewise, to say that a member assumes a text will mean 
to its audience what it means to her is plausibly just to say that the member 
understands her interpretation as correct.  In other words, Raz and Waldron 
read one way claim just that a text’s meaning is assumed by all parties to be 
objective.  Read another, more ambitious way, however, such claims amount to an 
endorsement of factionalism—or, to be more precise, a realist functional 
equivalent:  On this understanding, to read a text in accordance with “prevailing” 
conventions is to attach to it the “import” that “a reasonable person conversant 
with applicable social and linguistic” norms would, i.e. as expressing 
“objectified” intent.244  For the reasons articulated above, to so intend is to 
intend that a text be read as if written by a generic author. 
 
Richard Ekins argues similarly that a reasonable legislator intends that a 
legislative text have “the meaning that a reasonable sole legislator who attends 
to the context … would be likely to intend to convey in uttering” those words.245  
Ekins observes rightly that “meaning” attribution of the sort he imagines 
involves attribution of both linguistic and practical intentions.246  The 
                                                 
241 See infra note 282 and accompanying text. 
242 RAZ, supra note 7, at 286.   
243 JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 129 (1999); see also id. (“That such 
assumptions pervade the legislative process shows how much law depends on language, on the 
shared conventions that constitute a language, and on the reciprocity of intentions that 
conventions comprise.”).   
244 Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 11, at 424.   
245 RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 236 (2012).   
246 See id. at 235-36 (“It is possible for drafters to convey more than the semantic content of the 
bill alone because legislators have good reason to understand proposals for action to be the 
choice that a rational legislator would be likely to make in enacting this text.”).   
HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS  8/1/2016 1:59 PM 
47 
 
“reasonable sole legislator” that Ekins posits is plausibly more robust and, 
hence, more contestable than the generic author posited here.247  Still, Ekins 
comes close to defending a functional equivalent to fictionalism as a thesis about 
actual shared legislator intention. 
 
The problem with a generic author conception of legislative intent as a 
thesis about actual legislator intention is that such a thesis is difficult to square 
with the express position of some but not all legislators that interpreters owe 
special attention to legislative history, i.e. that interpreters should privilege 
legislators’ epistemic position.248  More plausible is that there just is no legislator 
consensus as to which interpretive norms should apply.249  Ekins might be right 
that a reasonable legislator would intend that a statute be read as if written by a 
generic author.250  The trouble is that, as an empirical matter, numerous actual 
legislators appear highly unreasonable. 
 
Fictionalism also shares similarities with so-called “original public 
meaning” originalism in constitutional interpretation.251  As characterized by 
Lawrence Solum, “[t]he original-meaning version of originalism emphasizes the 
meaning that the Constitution (or its amendments) would have had to the 
relevant audience at the time of its adoptions.”252  More precisely, original-
public-meaning originalists inquire into the “conventional” meaning of 
constitutional language “in context” at the time of adoption and ratification.253  
Original-public-meaning originalism thus contrasts with so-called “original 
                                                 
247 See, e.g., id. at 128 (“The sole legislator has a duty to oversee the content of the law and to act 
to change the law when this serves the common good.”); id. at 220 (“[P]roposals for action that 
are fit to be chosen by a reasonable sole legislator [are] coherent, reasoned plans to change the 
law.”); see also supra notes 236-237 and accompanying text.   
248 See KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 36 (observing that members of both parties “have 
consistently supported judicial resort to legislative history”).   
249 See supra notes 204-205 and accompanying text.   
250 See EKINS, supra, at 235-36; see also RAZ, supra note 7, at 286 (arguing that a legislator must 
intend that a legislative text be read in accordance with prevailing conventions because to intend 
otherwise would be futile and so irrational); cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Illinois 
Pub. Law Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008), at 5, http:// ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 
[hereinafter Solum, Semantic Originalism] (arguing that “under normal conditions successful 
constitutional communication requires reliance by the drafters, ratifiers, and interpreters on the 
original public meaning of the words and phrases”).   
251 E.g., Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2; Steven G. 
Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011). 
252 Id. at 51; see also Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. 923, 926 (2009) [hereinafter Solum, Heller and Originalism] (characterizing “original public 
meaning originalism” as “the view that the original meaning of a constitutional provision is the 
conventional semantic meaning that the words and phrases had at the time the provision was 
framed and ratified”). 
253 Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2. 
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intention” originalism,254 which has as its object of inquiry the actual, historical 
intentions of the enactors of the Constitution.255  Much like textualists,256 
original-public-meaning originalists tend to underestimate the role of pragmatics 
in communication.257  For that reason, original-public-meaning originalists rely 
upon the notion of “conventional” meaning to a greater extent than is, perhaps, 
warranted.258  Still, much like fictionalism, original-public-meaning originalism 
focuses quite plausibly on the communicative intentions one would attribute to 
the author of the Constitution as such.259  This despite the reluctance of original-
public-meaning originalists to talk in terms of ‘intent.’260 
 
 To illustrate the fictionalist approach, consider again the dispute in King.  
As described above, the Government claimed that it was “Congress’s intent” 
that the phrase “Exchange established by the State,” as used in IRC § 36B, refer 
to “both state-run and federally-facilitated Exchanges.”261  How to evaluate this 
                                                 
254 E.g., Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three 
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988).  As Richard Kay explains, original 
intention originalism is not to be confused with originalism about expected application.  See 
Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 703, 709-10 (2009) (characterizing “original intended meaning” as “the meaning that 
textual language had for the relevant enactors when they approved the text in question,” as 
contrasted with “the enactors’ expectations with respect to the particular instances that would 
come within the scope of the rules created”); see also Frederick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional 
Language, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 797, 806 (1982) (arguing that originalism about expected 
application is “implausible precisely because [it] ignore[s] the distinction between the meaning 
of a rule (such as a constitutional provision) and the instances of its application”). 
255 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 144 (1990) (“The search is not for a subjective intention ….  [W]hat counts is what 
the public understood.”). 
256 See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text. 
257 Solum, for example, appears to regard pragmatics as limited to vagueness and ambiguity 
resolution.  See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic and Normative Originalism: Comments on Brian Leiter’s 
“Justifying Originalism,” LEGAL THEORY BLOG, Oct. 30, 2007, 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2007/10/semantic-and-no.html. 
258 To illustrate, Solum contrasts “conventional” meaning with “special or idiosyncratic” 
meaning based upon the “secret” intentions of authors.  Solum, Heller and Originalism, supra note 
252, at 951-52.  Only to the extent that Solum has in mind intentions that are “special or 
idiosyncratic” given the practical context is that contrast is tenable.  See supra notes 40-67 and 
accompanying text. 
259 Whether the same sorts of arguments against shared intentions in Congress raised in Part II 
apply to the Framers goes beyond the scope of this Article.  There are, however, obvious 
disanalogies between the two settings (e.g., it is far more plausible that the Framers paid careful 
attention to constitutional text, see supra note 158). 
260 Steven Calabresi and Julia Rickert, for example, use the phrase “objective social meaning.”  
Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 251, at 8.  This general reluctance to talk of ‘intent’ suggests that 
at least some original-public-meaning originalists regard intent as a dispensable metaphor.  Cf. 
supra note 1. 
261 See supra notes 204-205 and accompanying text. 
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claim?  If fictionalism is correct, this claim is apt if and only if one would 
attribute to a generic author an intention refer to “both state-run and federally-
facilitated Exchanges” on the basis of her having written the phrase “Exchanges 
established by the State” in the context of enactment.  So understood, whether 
the Government’s claim is apt plausibly depends on what counts as the “context 
of enactment.” 
 
If context is limited to the operative and immediately surrounding 
statutory provisions, the Government’s claim appears somewhat implausible: 
More fully, § 36B refers to “Exchange[s] established by the State under section 
1311 of the [ACA].”262  Section 1311, in turn, encourages but does not require a 
state to “establish” an exchange.263  Section 1312 creates a backstop, directing 
the federal government, through the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
to “establish and operate such Exchange within [a] State” if that state opts not 
to establish an exchange under § 1311.264  Considering this explicit contrast 
between state and federal exchanges, one would likely take the author of § 36B 
to mean state by “state.” 
 
If, by contrast, context includes the ACA in its entirety, the 
Government’s position becomes much more plausible.  For one, the narrow 
reading of § 36B would give rise to various anomalies throughout the Act. 
Among other things, the Act would thus require the creation of federally 
facilitated Exchanges on which there would be no “qualified individuals” eligible 
to shop,265 as well as the reporting of information for a “[r]econciliation” of tax 
credits that could never occur.266 
 
The Government’s position becomes even more plausible if context is 
expanded further still include public discussion of the Act and its structure as a 
“three-legged stool”267: Again and again in 2008, the proposed healthcare reform 
was characterized as having three basic elements: 
 
First, people will be required to buy insurance, to spread costs 
among the sick and the healthy.  Second, insurers will be 
prohibited from cherry-picking only the healthiest customers, 
                                                 
262 26 U.S.C. § 36B. 
263 42 U.S.C. § 18031. 
264 Id. § 18032. 
265 Id. at 10 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031(d)(2)(A), 18032(f)(1)(A) (2012)). 
266 Id. at 13–14 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(f)(3)).  
267 Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Is a “Three-Legged Stool”: The Costs of Partially Repealing the 
Affordable Care Act, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 5, 2010), 
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2010/08/pdf/repealing_reform.pdf. 
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again to spread costs.  Finally, the government will give subsidies 
to people, like McDonald’s workers, who can’t afford insurance 
on their own.268 
 
Again and again it was emphasized that all three “legs” were necessary for the 
stool to stand.  Against this backdrop, one would likely attribute to the author 
of § 36B the intention to refer to both state and federal exchanges.  One would, 
in turn, understand her use of the phrase “Exchange established by the State” 
as a simple misstatement, i.e. a scrivener’s error.269  This Part discusses below 
how to determine of what information context consists.  As preview, the 
broader understanding of context is probably appropriate in this case. 
 
 This Article need take no position as to whether fictionalism about 
legislative intent is hermeneutic or revolutionary.270  At least some jurists are 
plausibly fictionalists.271  Others, however, are plainly not.272  What matters for 
present purposes is that fictionalism is the best way to rationalize discourse 
about legislative intent.  Whether some jurists are already fictionalists is a 
secondary concern. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
268 David Leonhardt, Health Care’s Uneven Road to a New Era, N.Y. TIMES (October 5, 2010), 
www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/business/economy/06leonhardt.html. 
269 Doerfler, supra note 27; Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, supra note 203.  As both of the cited articles 
suggest, so long as “context” includes the text of the ACA as a whole, the scrivener’s-error reading 
is probably—though not certainly—the best one. 
270 In other words, this Article need take no position as to whether fictionalism about legislative 
intent an error theory.  Cf. JOHN L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1977) 
(defending an error theory about moral discourse).  The only ‘error’ to which this Article is 
committed is that of members of Congress to the extent that members regard their individual 
intentions as attributable to Congress as such.  But see supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. 
(considering possibility that members share an intention that statutes be read as if written by a 
generic author). 
271 See United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Congress is 
a ‘they’ and not an ‘it’; a committee lacks a brain (or, rather, has so many brains with so many 
different objectives that it is almost facetious to impute a joint goal or purpose to the 
collectivity).  Legislation is an objective text approved in constitutionally prescribed ways; its 
scope is not limited by the cerebrations of those who voted for or signed it into law.” (citation 
omitted)); Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 11 at 17. 
272 See Auburn Hous. Auth. v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 138, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2002) (Katzmann, J.) (“If 
the meaning of the statute is ambiguous, the court may resort to canons of statutory 
interpretation to help resolve the ambiguity.  The court may also look at legislative history to 
determine the intent of Congress.” (citations omitted)). 
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C.  Context of Enactment and Legislative Process 
 
 Context is the “mutually salient information” that an author exploits to 
make evident to her audience what she means.273  Put another way, context is 
the information of which an author can reasonably expect her audience to be 
aware.  Thus, to determine the context of enactment for some statute, one must 
determine that statute’s audience.  For a given statute, the audience is, of course, 
diverse.274  Because, however, context consists of mutually salient information, 
i.e. information salient to all, one can start by identifying the least informed 
segment of the audience.  Where a statute operates on citizens, for example, the 
context of enactment is limited to information of which citizens should be 
aware.275  So much is required for a statute to have an accessible meaning that is 
constant across that statute’s audience.276 
 
 Conversely, because context is cognitive “common ground,”277 there is 
no reason to privilege the epistemic position of an author over that of her 
audience.  Suppose, for example, that certain information (e.g., a wedding 
                                                 
273 Bach, Content ex Machina, supra note 13, at 19. 
274 See Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian 
Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1127 (2011) (“[S]tatutes are directed to 
multiple audiences, including courts and agencies.”); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the 
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 576 (1985) (observing that, in addition to the 
administering agency, “most regulatory statutes’ audiences also include private parties whose 
conduct or status is subject to regulation by the administering agency”). 
275 By contrast, where a statute operates only upon sophisticated parties, the information 
plausibly included in the context of enactment is much greater.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Statutory Interpretation As Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 384 (1990) (“Highly technical 
statutes should not be read with the ‘common sense’ of the average person, but rather with the 
‘common sense’ of the special audience to which the statute is addressed (such as gas and oil 
companies or tax lawyers).”); Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic 
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). (exploring the “idea that a distinction 
can be drawn in the law between rules addressed to the general public and rules addressed to 
officials”).  Where, for example, a statute operates specifically upon financial institutions, an 
author can reasonably expect awareness of technical concepts in a way that she could not with 
respect to a general conduct statute.  See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)(A) (prohibiting a “banking 
entity” from engaging in “proprietary trading”).  Regulation of sophisticated parties in particular 
is thus one means by which Congress can regulate subject matter that an ordinary citizen could 
not be reasonably expected to understand. 
276 The legislative context thus contrasts with conversational contexts in which a speaker intends 
to communicate different things to different audience members.  Suppose, for example, that A 
and B are planning a surprise birthday party for C.  In that context, A might say to B, “I am 
looking forward to a quiet night in,” intending to communicate to B that the party is still on but 
to C that she is looking forward to a calm evening.  For a partial dissent, see Dan-Cohen, supra 
note 275 (arguing that the same law can function both as a “conduct” rule directed at citizens 
and as a “decision” rule directed at officials). 
277 Stalnaker, Indicative Conditionals, supra note 16, at 67. 
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anniversary) is of much higher salience to an author (e.g., a law professor) than 
to her audience (e.g., her students).  Here, it would be unreasonable for that 
author to try to exploit that information to make her intentions known (e.g., a 
take-home exam prompt indicating that the exam is due on “the special day” at 
5 PM).  Since her audience would predictably fail to call that information to 
mind, such an attempt by the author would predictably fail in turn. 
 
 Despite the above, much prior scholarship privileges the epistemic 
position of members of Congress when considering what information context 
of enactment includes.  What results is the eavesdropping model of interpretation.  
On this model, legislation is treated as having been written by legislators for 
legislators.  An interpreter is thus relegated to eavesdropper, listening in on a 
conversation between legislators.278  So situated, an interpreter is to read 
legislation taking into account information that is salient to legislators.  Scholars, 
in turn, debate whether sources such as legislative history contain such 
information.279 
 
Adherence to the eavesdropping model is plainest in scholarship that 
urges greater attention to the legislative process.  Judge Katzmann, for example, 
argues that an interpreter should pay special attention to those materials, such 
as committee reports, that “legislators” and “their staffs” use to “become 
educated about [a] bill.”280  Likewise, Gluck and Bressman recommend 
consideration of different kinds of legislative history (e.g., committee reports, 
floor statements) as well as other non-textual sources (e.g., CBO scores) and 
structural cues (e.g., type of legislative vehicle) in proportion to the significance 
those indicators have to drafters.281 Even those who oppose consideration of 
extra-textual sources such as legislative history, however, tend to accept the basic 
eavesdropping frame.  Even Justice Scalia, for instance, has characterized the 
                                                 
278 See, e.g., Andrei Marmor, The Pragmatics of Legal Language, RATIO JURIS 423, 434 (2008) (“Judges 
and litigants are not parties to the legislative conversation, so to speak, and they have to rely on 
secondary sources to gather the relevant information.”). 
279 See, e.g., Nelson, What Is Textualism?, supra note 17, at 363 (“Justice Scalia suggests not that the 
legislature’s actual collective intent is always nonexistent or irrelevant, but rather that judicial 
decisions will better approximate that intent if courts generally disregard legislative history than 
if they take it into account.”). 
280 KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 19. 
281 See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 989 (“[T]he real question about legislative 
history is not whether it should be consulted but, rather, how to separate the useful from the 
misleading.”); Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 22, at 782 (recommending that courts 
“constru[e] legislation consistently with the [corresponding] CBO score” because of the 
“centrality of the CBO score” to drafters). 
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role of an interpreter as “read[ing] the words of [a] text as any ordinary Member of 
Congress would have read them, and apply[ing] the meaning so determined.” 282 
 
As an alternative, this Article puts forward the conversation model of 
interpretation.  On this model, legislation is treated as having been written by 
legislators for those who administer the law (e.g., courts, agencies) and for those 
on whom the law operates (e.g., citizens).  An interpreter, in turn, occupies the 
position of conversational participant, listening to statements directed at her and 
the other participants.  From this position, an interpreter considers legislative 
text in light of information salient to legislators and, for example, citizens alike.  
Again, this approach involves attentiveness to the least informed segment of the 
group.  To the extent that information has little or no salience to this segment, 
an interpreter will place little or no weight on that information when determining 
what an author means. 
 
 The conversation model of interpretation does not by itself dictate 
which sources of information an interpreter should consider in a particular case.  
Again, context consists of the information of which both speaker and audience 
should be aware.  And, for example, how large a set of informational sources to 
which citizens should be attentive in a particular case is a question the model 
leaves open.  By deemphasizing the epistemic position of legislators, the model 
does, however, alter the set of plausible answers to such questions.  Go back to 
legislative history.  As discussed below, different considerations speak for and 
against holding an audience accountable for non-textual, historical informational 
sources such as legislative history in different cases.  That said, hard to imagine 
is a case in which it would be reasonable to hold an audience accountable for 
legislative history to the exclusion of other non-textual sources (e.g., newspaper 
articles, television reports, etc.).  Especially so if the case involves a law that 
operates upon citizens.  With the ACA, for example, can one seriously argue 
that, say, the Senate Finance Committee Report is of higher mutual salience than 
cotemporaneous front-page reporting from The New York Times or The Wall Street 
Journal?  Or contemporaneous evening news reports featuring officials and 
experts discussing the proposed law?  In short, legislative history is, on the 
conversation model, just one non-textual, historical source among many. 
 
 Even less plausible is the suggestion that an interpreter should sort 
carefully among different kinds of legislative history.  Gluck and Bressman, for 
example, urge courts “to separate the useful from the misleading,” reasoning 
that attention to the legislative process reveals some kinds of legislative history 
                                                 
282 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
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as more “reliable” than others.283  Gluck and Bressman base their comparative 
reliability assessments on the views of congressional staffers.  Given this 
evidence, it is entirely plausible that, say, committee reports are of much higher 
salience than floor statements to staffers.284  Conceivably the same is true of 
agencies, given their “multilevel and ongoing relationship with Congress.”285  And 
perhaps the same is (somewhat) true of courts, given their (uneven) history of 
privileging committee reports over other legislative historical sources.286  Add 
ordinary citizens to the conversational mix, however, and any difference in 
mutual salience quickly becomes de minimis.  If judicial understanding of the 
legislative process is lacking,287 popular understanding is woeful at best.  More 
still, as explained in Part II,  committee reports and the like have no claim to 
authority. 288  As such, it is hard to see how citizens have an obligation to be 
privy to such distinctions.289 
 
Privileging the epistemic position of members of Congress can suggest 
textual clarity where there is none. In Zuber v. Allen,290 for example, the Supreme 
Court invalidated a Department of Agriculture order requiring milk distributors 
within the Boston marketing area to pay premium prices to “nearby” milk 
producers.291  The Court held that this “nearby” differential was inconsistent 
with a federal statute requiring that orders regulating the handling of milk 
provide for uniform prices to all producers within a given marketing area, 
subject to specific exceptions.292  The Court rejected the Government’s 
argument that the “nearby” differential fit within the exception for “market ... 
                                                 
283 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 977. 
284 See id. 
285 Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. 
L. REV. 871, 884 (2015) (observing that this relationship allows agencies “firsthand knowledge 
of the critical debates and the character of their resolution,” making them “more reliable readers 
of legislative history”); see also Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 22, at 676 (noting that 
“drafters saw their primary interpretive relationship as one with agencies”). 
286 See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (“In surveying legislative history we have 
repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the 
Committee Reports on the bill ….”); but see infra notes 290-299 and accompanying text. 
287 See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
288 Nourse, for example, argues that, owed to ignorance of the legislative process, interpreters 
routinely confuse the legislative history equivalents of “majority” and “dissenting opinions.”  
Nourse, supra note 1, at 73.  As explained in Part II, however, Nourse is wrong to regard these 
alleged “majority opinions” (e.g., statements by a bill’s primary sponsors) as “authoritative 
statements of meaning.”  Id. 
289 Any hierarchy of legislative history thus contrasts with, for example, statutory text or prior 
judicial decisions, both of which are formally binding on citizens and so more plausibly generate 
a duty of inquiry. 
290 396 U.S. 168 (1969). 
291 Id. at 170-71. 
292 Id. 
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differentials customarily applied” by distributors, holding that “permissible 
adjustments are limited to compensation for rendering an economic service,” 
characterizing the “nearby” differential as a conferral of “monopoly profits.”293  
The Court based its interpretation on the accompanying House Report, which 
“suggest[ed] that ‘market differentials,’ as well as all the other differentials, 
contemplated particular understood economic adjustments.”294  In dissent, 
Justice Black contended that the broader legislative history, in particular a 
colloquy on the Senate floor, “ma[de] it clear beyond any doubt that this 
provision was designed to allow the Secretary broad leeway in regulating the 
milk industry.”295  This included leeway to preserve price advantages enjoyed by 
farmers near Boston prior to federal regulation.296  The majority insisted that its 
“conclusions [were] in no way undermined by the colloquy on the floor,” 
reasoning that, whereas “[a] committee report represents the considered and 
collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and 
studying proposed legislation,” “[f]loor debates reflect at best the understanding 
of individual Congressmen.”297 
 
 What the exchange between the majority and dissent in Zuber suggests 
is that the statute was simply “silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue” before the Court.298  Read in isolation, the language at issue admits of a 
                                                 
293 Id. at 181, 188. 
294 Id. at 181. 
295 Id. at 202-03 (Black, J., dissenting). 
296 Id. 
297 Id. at 186; but see Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 986 (finding that drafters regard 
“‘staged’ colloquies between the chair and ranking  member  of  the  committee  as  reliably  
indicating  the  common  understanding  on  both  sides”). 
298 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, (1984).  While 
Zuber is a pre-Chevron case, courts continue to consult legislative history when determining 
whether an agency interpretation is “reasonable,” and therefore authoritative under Chevron.  See 
id. at 843 (“[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a 
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”).  While courts disagree as 
to whether it is appropriate to consult legislative history at Step One or Step Two of the Chevron 
analysis, compare Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that “the lower 
court erred by failing to ‘exhaust the traditional tools of statutory construction,’” including 
consultation of legislative history, at Chevron Step One (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 
v. Browner, 57 F.3d 1122, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1995)) with Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 
F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2007) (“This court has generally been reluctant to employ legislative 
history at step one of Chevron analysis, mindful that the ‘interpretive clues’ to be found in such 
history will rarely speak with sufficient clarity to permit us to conclude ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ that Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” (quoting Gen. 
Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586, 590 (2004)) (citation omitted)), that 
distinction is likely irrelevant.  See Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has 
Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 602 (2009) (“[N]othing of consequence turns on whether the 
set of permissible interpretations has one element or more than one element; the only question 
is whether the agency’s interpretation is in that set or not.”).  Courts likewise continue to 
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broad or narrow reading.  The same is true after taking into account information 
contained in available non-textual historical sources.  The majority created an 
illusion of clarity by distinguishing “good” legislative history from “bad.”  The 
reality, however, is that the text read against the backdrop of conflicting 
legislative history is unclear as to whether “market … differentials” includes 
differentials that are “economically [un]sound.”299  
 
 To be clear, one could have reason to pay special attention to committee 
reports and the like if Congress as such formed intentions.  Where an author’s 
intentions are unclear after taking into account in all mutually salient 
information, clarity will sometimes result from considering additional 
information salient to the author.  Suppose, for example, that a diplomat were 
to write an unclear note to her aide (e.g., “Bring me the package.”), only to be 
taken hostage days later.  Here, the aide might try to resolve the unclarity (e.g., 
“What package?”) by considering sources of information she ordinarily would 
not (e.g., the diplomat’s private email).  Because considering such sources is non-
standard (and, hence, the information contained therein was not mutually salient 
at the time the note was written), it would have been unreasonable for the 
diplomat to expect her aide to do so.  Still, to the extent that the diplomat’s 
message was unintentionally unclear, the aide might gain insight by considering 
those sources all the same.  The same would be true with respect to unclear 
statutes if Congress as such formed intentions.  But it does not.  As such, there 
are no unexpressed intentions to discover in Congress’ personal effects. 
 
Because it places members of Congress on equal epistemic footing with 
other participants in the legislative conversation, fictionalism differs from the 
otherwise similar “deferentialist” approach to statutory interpretation advocated 
by Scott Soames.  According to Soames, the “content of the law” as “what the 
lawmakers meant and what any reasonable person who understood the linguistic 
meanings of their words, the publically available facts, the recent history in the 
lawmaking context, and the background of existing law into which the new 
provision is expected to fit, would take them to have meant.”300  As Soames 
explains: 
                                                 
privilege some kinds of legislative history over others, both in the administrative law context 
and elsewhere.  See, e.g., Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for C.D.Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir.) 
(“Floor statements are not given the same weight as some other types of legislative history, such 
as committee reports, because they generally represent only the view of the speaker and not 
necessarily that of the entire body. However, floor statements by the sponsors of the legislation 
are given considerably more weight than floor statements by other members, and they are given 
even more weight where, as here, other legislators did not offer any contrary views.” (citation 
omitted)). 
299 Zuber, 396 U.S. at 210 (Black, J., dissenting). 
300 Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 15 at 598 (emphasis added).   
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In general, what a speaker uses a sentence S to assert in a given 
context is, to a fair approximation, what a reasonable hearer or 
reader who knows the linguistic meaning of S, and is aware of 
all relevant intersubjectively available features of the context of 
the utterance, would rationally take the speaker’s use of S to be 
intended to convey and commit the speaker to.301 
 
In a circumstance where a speaker’s communicative intention is unclear, 
however, what a speaker “meant” diverges from “what any reasonable person 
… would take them to have meant.”  And, because Soames is a realist about 
legislative intent,302 his account is thus consistent with, and, as a descriptive 
matter, appears to call for, special attention to committee report and the like 
where a statute is unclear.303 
 
 In addition to legislative history, the conversation model also calls into 
question whether it makes sense for courts to pay special attention to customary 
legal usage.  In Morissette v. United States,304 for example, Justice Jackson famously 
remarked: 
 
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are 
accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of 
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas 
that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of 
learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will 
convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.305 
 
In the above-quoted passage, Justice Jackson appears to understand legislation 
as communication between members of Congress and courts, which is to say 
communication between lawyers.306  If the statute at issue had been, say, the 
                                                 
301 Id. (emphasis added). 
302 See id. at 599-600 (“[T]here is thus no real alternative in [Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 
(1993)] identifying the legal content with what Congress actually asserted (as opposed to what it could 
have asserted using the same words had the arguments, debates, and legislative history been 
different).”) 
303 See Scott Soames, Toward a Theory of Legal Interpretation, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 231, 239-40 
(2011) (lamenting Justice Scalia’s “conclu[sion] that inquiries into legislative history to discover 
the intent of the lawmakers are irrelevant”). 
304 342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
305 Id. at 263. 
306 See Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 12, at 2464 (discussing Morissette, observing that 
“[f]or statutes, the lawyer's lexicon, of course, has particular relevance”) 
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Judiciary Act of 1789,307 Justice Jackson’s approach might have made sense.  In 
Morissette, however, the statute at issue was a general conduct statute, specifically 
a criminal statute prohibiting the “embezzle[ment], steal[ing], purloin[ing], or 
knowing[] conver[sion]” government property.308  The question before the 
Court was whether that statute prohibited only “embezzle[ment],” “steal[ing],” 
or “purloin[ing]” accompanied by criminal intent.  The Government argued 
that no, contending that the express prohibition of “knowing[]” conversion 
implied the absence of an intent requirement for the other offenses.309  
Unconvinced, the Court reasoned that, at common law, intent was “inherent in 
the idea” of larceny and other such crimes, whereas certain “unwitting acts” 
constituted conversion.310  Thus, on the assumption that Congress intended to 
retain common-law usages, an express intent requirement would have been 
superfluous for the non-conversion offenses. 
 
 The decision in Morissette was plausibly correct, on rule-of-lenity311 
grounds.312  Justice Jackson’s general principle, that statutes should be read 
                                                 
307 1 Stat. 73. 
308 Morissette, 246 U.S. at 248 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 641). 
309 See id. at 249-50. 
310 Id.at 252-53. 
311 In general, whether “substantive” canons of interpretation (e.g., the modern canon of 
constitutional avoidance, the federalism canon, etc.) are compatible with the conversation model 
is an open question.  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW 
TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION __ (2016) (discussing these and other substantive 
canons).  To the extent that such canons are best understood as approximations of Congress’s 
intent, those canons likely reflect the sort of undue attention to the epistemic position of 
members of Congress criticized above (e.g., a special concern with maintaining the “usual 
constitutional balance of federal and state powers,” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460 
(1991), is probably not shared by most citizens).  On the other hand, if such canons are best 
understood as something like judge-made law, see William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law 
of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2017), then it is plausible that those canons 
are on par with other prior judicial decisions in terms of mutual salience.  See supra note __.  
The latter possibility assumes, of course, that judges have the authority to make interpretive law.  
Regardless, the rule of lenity demands less justification than other substantive canons.  The 
reason is that the rule of lenity acts as something like a doctrinal mechanism for enforcing the 
mutual-salience requirement imposed by the conversation model—or at least a greatly relaxed 
analogue.  By prohibiting the enforcement of an uncertain interpretation against a criminal 
defendant, the rule of lenity, in effect, bars courts from giving legal effect to a reading of a 
criminal statute that is, from the epistemic perspective of the defendant, unduly esoteric.  See, 
e.g., U.S. v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2026 (2008) (“When interpreting a criminal statute, we do 
not play the part of a mind reader.”); but see U.S. v. Muscarello, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (“The 
rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, . . . we can 
make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” (quoting United States v. Wells, 519 
U. S. 482, 499 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)). 
312 See, e.g., WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, THIRD EDITION 940 (1916) (defining “steal” 
as “to take without right and with intent to keep wrongfully” (emphasis added)).   
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through the eyes of a lawyer, however, seems questionable as applied to statutes 
the audience of which includes ordinary citizens presumably—and 
reasonably—not well-versed in Blackstone.313 
 
 The question remains what sources to consider in a particular case.  
Because context is information of which speaker and audience should be aware, 
that question is irreducibly normative.314  The normative character of the 
question is especially apparent where, as here, awareness is largely 
constructive.315  In general, norms of statutory interpretation should promote at 
least two core values.316  The first is democracy: norms should make it feasible for 
a legislator to comprehend a bill at the time she casts her vote.  The second is 
fair notice: norms should make it feasible for an individual on whom a statute 
operates to comprehend that statute once it is in effect.  So understood, 
democracy and fair notice work in tandem to facilitate communication between 
legislator and citizen.  Democracy ensures that a legislator understands what she 
is saying.  Fair notice ensures that a citizen understands what was said.  Put 
another way, a commitment to the above values flows just from a commitment 
to legislation as an effective means of communication.317  As Jeremey Waldon 
explains, when attempting to communicate by statute, a legislator must assume 
that her words mean the same thing to her as to citizens.318  Together, democracy 
and fair notice help make it possible for that assumption to be a reasonable one. 
 
 Prior scholarship assumes both of these values, though often without 
explicit discussion.  Textualists, for example, stress, on the one hand, the 
                                                 
313 Important here is that the statute at issue in Morissette was enacted in 1948. 62 Stat. 725.     
314 See Fallon, Three Symmetries, supra note 85, at 694 (“If both textualists and purposivists need 
to specify the breadth of the context within which statutes should be interpreted, and if the 
judgments as to appropriate breadth will sometimes determine the outcome of cases, then issues 
bearing on the specification of semantic and policy contexts assume vital importance.”). 
315 See Drury Stevenson, To Whom Is the Law Addressed?, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 105, 105-06 
(2003) (“The people who are subject to the law—the citizens—are almost certain never to read 
it.  Average citizens do not peruse statute books even once in their lifetimes; most will never 
read even one full paragraph from a court opinion.”). 
316 See Nelson, What Is Textualism?, supra note 17, at 353 (“Textualists and intentionalists alike 
give every indication of caring both about the meaning intended by the enacting legislature and 
about the need for readers to have fair notice of that meaning ….”).  See also Manning, Inside 
Congress’s Mind, supra note 28, at 1947 (arguing that the “construct” of legislative intent 
“necessarily depend[s] on normative” premises). 
317 More specifically, that legislation is an effective means of communication between legislator 
and citizen (as opposed to, e.g., other legislators, legal elites, etc.).  As explained above, so much 
is required by basic notions of fairness and rule of law.  See supra note 208-214 and accompanying 
text. 
318 WALDRON, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 129. 
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preservation of legislative “bargains,”319 and, on the other, the public 
accessibility of the law.320  What this shows is a commitment by textualists to 
both legislator (when she casts her vote) and citizen (post-enactment) being able 
to know “what the law is”321 when it matters.  And this, in turn, shows a 
commitment to effective communication between legislator and citizen.  
Purposivists, perhaps unsurprisingly, given their friendliness to legislative 
history, place more emphasis on legislator understanding.322  Still, even 
purposivists accept that, for example, courts should consider only publicly 
available materials when making sense of a statute.323  This concession shows 
that, in addition to legislator understanding, purposivists are to at least some 
extent committed to citizen understanding as well. 
 
With respect to informational sources, both democracy and fair notice 
support, other things equal, norms that minimize the epistemic burden for 
involved parties.  By minimizing epistemic burden, such norms increase 
feasibility of comprehension at all stages (e.g., enactment, compliance, 
enforcement, adjudication) for all interpreters (e.g., members of Congress, 
citizens, agencies, courts).  To illustrate, take a highly restrictive source norm 
according to which one is to refrain completely from considering non-textual, 
historical sources when interpreting a statute.  Pursuant to this norm, one would 
interpret a legislative text with an eye to obvious conventions (e.g., that Congress 
writes statutes in English) and to other formally binding instruments (e.g., statutes, 
regulations, judicial decisions).324  In turn, one would attribute to Congress 
                                                 
319 See, e.g., Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 11, at 441 (“[Textualists] believe that smoothing 
over the rough edges in a statute threatens to upset whatever complicated bargaining led to its 
being cast in the terms that it was.”); Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 541 (“In the case of interest 
group legislation it is most likely that the extent of the bargain … is exhausted by the subjects 
of the express compromises reflected in the statute.  The legislature ordinarily would rebuff any 
suggestion that judges be authorized to fill in blanks in the ‘spirit’ of the compromise.”). 
320 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As A Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 
(1989) (“Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have the means of 
knowing what it prescribes.”). 
321 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
322 See Nelson, What Is Textualism?, supra note 17, at 351-52 (observing that purposivists 
“emphasiz[e] that statutes are mechanisms to convey the policy decisions of the people whom 
we have elected to legislate for us,” and courts should “try to enforce the directives that members 
of the enacting legislature understood themselves to be adopting”); see also, e.g., McNollgast, 
Positive Canons, supra note 99, at 716 (emphasizing that “legislators do not want judicial 
interpretation of statutes to introduce randomness and unpredictability into policy outcomes”). 
323 See Nelson, What Is Textualism?, supra note 17, at 359 (observing that purposivists are “happy 
to treat committee reports and other publicly available materials as part of the context” but 
“reject other information that is probative of lawmakers’ actual intentions but not spread out 
on the public record”). 
324 The reason for including other formally binding instruments is that their bindingness 
presumably generates a notice duty in just the same way as does the statutory text itself. 
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whatever intentions one would attribute to a generic author on the basis of her 
having written that text, given this limited additional contextual information.  
With this norm in place, the epistemic burden on an interpreter would be 
minimal at each stage.  The non-obvious information one would have to 
consider—the text of other formally binding instruments—would be of 
reasonably limited quantity, easy to access,325 and clearly designated. 
 
 What speaks against such a norm?  As applied to existing legislation, one 
concern is that such a norm might conflict with legislator understanding at the 
time of enactment.  Suppose that some legislator were to base her understanding 
of some statute, either directly or indirectly, on the assumption that the statute 
would be read with an eye to various non-textual, historical sources.  Here, 
application of a highly restrictive source norm might render that legislator’s 
understanding incorrect.  In turn, application of that norm might hinder 
democracy if that legislator’s understanding is representative.  This sort of 
mismatch is, as Jarrod Shobe has argued, more likely with older statutes.326  As 
Shobe explains, “Congress’s drafting process has become increasingly 
sophisticated over the last forty years,” with various reforms “allow[ing] 
professional drafters to be involved in virtually every legislative project.”327  The 
result is increased attention to textual “clarity,”328 which is just to say decreased 
reliance on non-textual, historical sources.  But even with contemporary statutes, 
mismatch is possible.  Increased “unorthodox lawmaking,”329 i.e. lawmaking 
outside the traditional committee structure, undermines, to some extent, efforts 
at clarity.330  Further, use of “professional drafters,” i.e. legislative counsel, 
remains entirely optional.331 
 
The above suggests that application of a highly restrictive source norm 
to existing legislation would result in a sort of democracy gap, however minimal.  
For that reason, a less restrictive norm is probably appropriate with respect to 
such legislation.  Application of a less restrictive norm would increase the 
epistemic burden on all participants, citizens in particular.  For that reason, 
application of such a norm would impair fair notice to some degree.  Under 
                                                 
325 Assuming internet access. 
326 See Shobe, supra note 159, at 856-60. 
327 Id. at 812. 
328 Id. at 831.  But see Doerfler, supra note 27, at 815 (arguing that the size and complexity of 
contemporary statutes hinders efforts at textual precision); Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, supra note 
203, at 97-103 (similar). 
329 BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE 
U.S. CONGRESS (4th ed., 1997). 
330 See Shobe, supra note 159, at 859. 
331 Id. at 821-22. 
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current conditions, however, some tradeoff between fair notice and democracy 
is unavoidable. 
 
 By contrast, as applied to future legislation, a highly restrictive source 
norm would be appropriate if accompanied by reforms to the legislative process.  
If, for example, Congress were to mandate participation of legislative counsel at 
each stage of the drafting process, any democracy gap would close, at least in 
large part.  Absent such a gap, it is unclear what would speak against such an 
epistemic-burden minimizing norm. 
 
 To be clear, the above discussion leaves open the possibility that values 
other than democracy and fair notice (e.g., judicial administrability) might 
inform the determination of what source(s) of information an interpreter ought 
to consider.  The claim here is just that those two values are of paramount 
importance insofar as legislation is understood best as a means of 
communication.  To promote democracy and fair notice in this context is, in 
effect, to reduce the burden on speaker and listener, respectively, and thereby to 
facilitate efficient communication between them.   
CONCLUSION 
 
 Legislative intent is a necessary fiction.  One can make sense of federal 
statutes only if one attributes to Congress various intentions, both 
communicative and practical.  As an empirical matter, however, Congress qua 
“it” intends very little.  The solution this Article proposes is to understand intent 
attributions not as aiming at the literal truth but rather as involving a pretense.  
The pretense this Article offers is that federal statutes have some author or 
other.  Taken to involve this pretense, an attribution of intent is apt if and only 
if one would make it about the author of a statute as such. 
 
Because legislative intent is a fiction, the ‘author’ of legislation, i.e. 
Congress as such, ‘intends’ what it appears to intend and no more.  Oftentimes 
this will mean that federal statutes are less clear than one might have hoped.  If 
Congress had ‘hidden’ intentions, statutes that appear uncertain might become 
certain upon further investigation.  And if statutes were uncertain less often, 
interpreting courts and agencies would have fewer policy decisions to make 
when resolving concrete disputes.  The draw of positive-political-science 
accounts of legislative intent comes in no small part from the promise that, with 
enough data and methodological savvy, one could, when confronted with hard 
policy questions, identify answers laid down by Congress in advance.  What this 
Article suggests, however, is that that promise is false.  Quite often, text gives 
HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS  8/1/2016 1:59 PM 
63 
 
out, leaving a policy decision.  Attention to the nuances of legislative process 
does nothing to change this. 
 
Whether one should fill the remaining statutory “gaps”332 by, for 
example, applying “legal rules of interpretation”333 or by deferring to executive 
branch officials334 goes beyond the scope of this Article.335  What this Article 
shows is just that that question is more important than it would be if sifting 
through obscure legislative materials could provide meaningful guidance to a 
faithful-agent court. 
                                                 
332 E.g., Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent 
Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530, 537 (2013) (“[I]f a court chooses to follow the linguistic meaning of 
text, it must decide how to fill in the gaps when the linguistic meaning does not fully answer a 
legal dispute ….”); Scott Soames, Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and Is Not, Special About the 
Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS, VOLUME 1: NATURAL LANGUAGE: WHAT IT MEANS AND 
HOW WE USE IT 403, 419 (2008) [hereinafter Soames, Interpreting Legal Texts] (“This generation 
of new content by filling gaps in the original text is another respect in which legal 
interpretation is importantly different from some other kinds of linguistic interpretation.”). 
333 Baude & Sachs, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
334 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006) (recommending increased deference to administrative 
agencies on questions of statutory interpretation). 
335 See Soames, Interpreting Legal Texts, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 419-20 
(“What considerations should be employed in exercising [gap-filling] authority is a normative 
question to which broad philosophical principles … provide different answers.  The philosophy 
of language, by contrast, provides none.”); cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: 
A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 
219 (1991) (“If meaning has run out, and we are faced with a linguistically hard case, then 
nothing about the nature of meaning suggests that we must then ask the ‘What would James 
Madison have thought about this?’ question.”). 
